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It 1© m

belief that so long as the two Governments

maintain a perfectly appreciative attitude toward each
other, so long as there is no lack of statesmanship to
guide public opinion, the reign of peace and tranquility
in our part of the world will remain unchallenged»

Viscount Ishli
7 November 1917

ill

PREFACE
This paper has been written primarily to reveal the
Japanese aide of the Lansing**Ishil negotiation© (or as it
is referred to in Japan, the Ishli-Lansing negotiations),
The main source for material on the Japanese position was
microfilmed records of the Japanese Foreign Office obtained
from the United States Library of Congress*
I wish to acknowledge the indispensable translation
assistance provided by my wife Mltsuyo Endleott*

Without

her devotion the more than one hundred Foreign Office
messages written in bureaucratic, T&isho Japanese would
have never seen this writing*
We hope that this paper will contribute meaningfully
to the historic scholarship on this often maligned
agreement*

Tokyo, 1967
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CHAPTER I
THE NEED FOR AN UNDERSTANDING
The Japanese government had become apprehensive and
confused as to American policy In China by early 1917*
This uncertainty as to the intentions of her great eastern
neighbor was the result, in large measure, of the inter
play between the American Minister in Peiping, Paul 3*
Relnsch, the State Department, and the Japanese themselves.
On the one hand was Relnsch, articulate spokesman for
Chinese interests, often acting far beyond the normal call
of duty for a diplomatic representative.

In fact, on

occasion he acted as confidential advisor to members of the
Chinese Foreign Office, and he always did his utmost to
counter and retard what he considered as Japanese com
mercial, political and military encroachment Into China.*
On the other hand was the American State Department,
headed during the first years of World War I by the silvertongued William Jennings Bryan, and then, during the period
considered in this paper, by Robert Lansing.

Both men were

champions of American commercial activity in China through
adherence to the principles of equal opportunity and respect
*Paul S. Relnsch, An American Diplomat in China (Garden
City, N.Y.J Doub 1eday,“"page and 'Comp., 1§£277 P*~3W'4.

2
for the open door.

Both men had occasion to disavow the

over zealous deeds of their Minister Relnsch.2
In Between, caught by some embryonic form of American
"double diplomacy" was the Japanese government, guilty of
encroachment as charged by the United States, but nonethe
less, baffled by the contradictions of American diplomacy.
These contradictions did nothing to help the Japanese
policy-makers in their drive to have a completed diplomatic
position relative to China prior to the end of the First
World War.

Japan wanted the Shantung Peninsula and wished

to secure all advances made at the expense of China and
Germany during the war.

In short, Japan hoped to insure

diplomatically that which she held by force of arms*3
The Japanese had become party to the Declaration of
London, and had signed individual pacts with the various
Allies to assure her position and desiderata at the con
ference table.

When the United States entered the war and

likewise gained a seat at the post-war peace negotiations,
a
she too had to be reckoned with.
2

U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States* 1917 (Washingtons ~u'.S. Governmenfc PrTnlTng
SITIce. T5^5T7 p. 117.
^A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern policy of the
United States (New Haven and londonl 7ale (Mive rslty""feeas,

155577 p T W T ^Ibid. The Declaration of London of September* 5$ 191^$
was a mutual declaration by England, France and Russia not
to consider peace with Germany except by general agreement
among the three allied powers.

3
Japan had received the Bryan Mote of March, 1915#
during the period of the controversy over the Twenty-one
Demands*

This note apparently conceded certain Interests

in China to Japan*^

Two months later, she had received

the May, 1915# caveat which had the effect of negating
the March note*^
Which note represented the time American policy?

Did

Relnsch speak for himself or for the State Department?
These questions, among others, plagued the Japanese and
underlined the need to arrive at a settlement with the
United States.

A settlement which, It was hoped, could

unravel these seemingly endless contradictions.
The United States, on the other hand, had every reason
to desire an understanding with Japan*

American attention

was being diverted from the Pacific area by full partici
pation In the European war.

Mils©n desired that Chinese

territorial integrity be respected as well as her political
independence,1^ and the State Department had strong reason
^U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States* 1915 (Washington:THIST' oovernSeiSi^'TrlntTng
T s m s i , iggtTTppT 105- m .
6Ibid.
^Burton F. Beers, Vain Endeavor, Robert Lansing9s
Attempts to End the Amerl'c'an-^'Spaneae M v a Y r y (iXarham,
H.C.: 15uil University Tfreas, l§fe£), p7,n2$ and pp. 16-17♦

4
to suspect that Japan had a current Interest In a German
detente.

ft

As early as 1916, Lansing had received information
from the American Ambassador in Tokyo, Guthrie, that Japan
was interested in a settlement with the United States,
Guthrie was able to report what concessions the Japanese
government might fee willing to make.

These points generally

revolved around the following items:

Japan might promise to

drop her complaints about the immigration issue; might sur
render her claims to German political and military rights
in Shantung; and American commercial Interests in China
proper would not be resisted.^
In return, Japan would expect recognition of the
existence of her special interests In South Manchuria, and
10
acquiescence in Japanese leadership of East Asia*
Such wishful thinking was not limited to the Japanese#
Americans also were predisposed to working out some-kindof-agreement with the Japanese*

In Burton F. Beers* book

Vain Endeavor, an interesting thesis is found with regard
to Lansing*© concept of a Far Eastern settlement based
strictly on American commercial Interests.

Beers explains

®Frank W* Xkle. *Japanese-German Peace Negotiations
during World War I, The American Historical Heview, LXXI
(October, 1965), pp* 6 2 - 7 6 * ..
9Beers, 0£. oit., p. 104.
10lbid.

5
that Lansing's ideas went so far as to encompass the trans
fer of the Philippines to Japan in order to eliminate the
basic Far East weakness of the United States*
With reference to China, Lansing had outlined his
interpretation of American policy when, acting for Bryan
in 191^# he had informed Keinsch that in China ,r. * *
America’s primary aim was to safeguard all American rights
in China, to protect all legitimate American interests
there and promote by all proper methods the development of
American trade.fl12

He was emphatic that China’s territorial

Integrity and its defense should not involve the United
States in international difficulties.1^
Lansing’s grand scheme for a Japanese-American settle
ment based purely on American economic interests ran head
long into what may be called “Wilsonian logic•M

What

Wilson envisaged as the United Stated role in China was
preservation of China’s administrative and territorial
integrity through strict adherence to the open door*

He

hoped to help China develop along “modern, democratic,
and Christian lines.h1^
n m a .t pp. 108- 109.
*2U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relatione of the
United States-191^ (Washington! U.S. Government Printing
"TSaSTTppT 189-190.

6tm&,

13Ibld.
^Beera, op. eit., p. 29 and pp. 16-17.

6
When an opportunity presented itself for possible
high level talks to clarify American policy, the Japanese
were quick to act*

Such an .occasion occurred on May 12,

19IT, during talks in Washington between Japanese Ambas
sador Sato and the American Secretary of State Robert
Lansing,

During the meeting, the American Secretary

mentioned to Ambassador Sato that the sending of a
special envoy to the United States would "greatly con
tribute to the friendly relations between the two
nations.n1^
Sato received the idea most favorably and set about
to convince the folcyo government of its desirability.
In a cable to Minister for Foreign Affairs Motono, Sato
reported the conversation and expressed the opinion that
since Russia, Italy, Britain and France had sent, or were
preparing to send, delegations to the United States, It
would seem most appropriate for Japan to do likewise.

He

reported that Secretary Lansing had suggested that the
mission should appear to be Japanese-initiated and not
at America1s request,
^^Hlikomatsu Kamlkawa, Japan-Aroerican Diplomatic
Relations in the MeiJ1-Tajsii'6 SraT1'traiSIa¥ea'Ey11S7"""fUraura
X¥oi^roT*w Pan-Fac 1i?ic £ re'si , rI95B7, p. 339*
^Japan, Foreign Office Documents, Cable 186, Sato to
Motono, May 15," 1917 * "TBter^ihatffcer "referred to as Foreign
Office,)

7
Sato and Lanaing also discussed the possibility of
sending an American mission to Japan,

Lansing indicated

that perhaps Mr, Elihu Root, former American Secretary of
State, could visit Japan, but nothing substantive came from
this meeting*

Sato commented to Tokyo that it "appeared“

as if the United States wished to resolve existing problems
between the two countries. ^
In a follow-up cable, Sato pointed out to hi© govern
ment that since the release of the Zimmerman Telegram, "much
ill will is found in the United States toward Japan and the
Japanese,” implying that the visit of a special mission
could help relieve tensions between the two nations.
Sato also reported to Tokyo that Lansing would probably
talk on matters relative to the more efficient use of sup
plies by the Allies, and on Pacific

s e c u r i t y . 3^

However,

on May 22nd, Sato forwarded a letter from Lansing which
stated that at this early stage, he did not want to get
bogged down with agenda items*

The American secretary

recommended that the mission be publicly identified only
20
as congratulatory In nature*"

loporeiKn Office, Unnumbered cable, Sato to Motono,
May 22, i^l'f (receTvid).
19lbld.
20ForelKn Office, Cable 187, Sato to Motono, May 17,
1917 (received).

a
Foreign Minister Motono replied in a cable sent to
Sato on May 22nd* that he .agreed with the idea of sending
a special mission.

He said the next step was to decide who

would head the mission#

Sato was instructed to keep the
21
matter secret for the time being#
On the 25th of May, Motono received another dispatch
from Sato forwarding Lansing*s comments about a meeting#
The American Secretary of State had agreed in the necessity
for a special mission, and said that secrecy should be
maintained for the present#

He suggested haste in sending

the mission once Its coa^osition was decided*^
On the 30th, Motono instructed Sato to question Lansing
as to the acceptability of the Viscount Ishii and a sup
porting staff for the mission#2^

Sato replied on the 31st

that he had met with Lansing and the latter said he would
ph.
be very happy to welcome the Viscount*

^Foreign Office, Cable 159# Motono to Sato, May 22,
1917 (dispat'cSed)•
^Foreign Office* Cable 195, Sato to Motono, May 25,
1917 (received).
Foreign Office, Cable 167, Motono to Sato, May 30,
1917 (dispatched)*

^Foreign Office# Cable 209# Sato to Motono# May 31*
1917 (dlipatcHedyi---

CHAPTER II
DIPLOMATIC PREPARATIONS
On June 15, 1917, shortly after Ishil had been con
firmed as special envoy, the Japanese Ambassador to the
United States called on Secretary of State Lansing to
protest an early-June note sent by the American secretary
to the Chinese government counseling It to end internal
strife before entry into the World War.

Sato Indicated

that his government considered the note to be gross inter
ference in Chinese matters at a time when his government
considered China the prime responsibility of Japan.
Specifically Sato stated:
• • * as Japan has a predominate interest in
China, politically and economically* Japan will
suffer greater damages than any other nation if
conditions become serious. However* Japan takes
a policy of non-interference toward China and so*
does not intend to make anyproposal concerning
this political crisis . . .
Ambassador Sato then injected the Bryan Hot© of March
13, 1915, into the conversation* and asked that the not©,
especially the portion referring to Japan’s Mspecial and
m2
close relations, political as well as economic . . .
b©
^Kamlkawa* op. oit.* pp. 335-336.
2U •3* Department 01 State* Forsijgn JRelations^ of the
United States-1917 (Washingtons 't/.S.Goverrmfent 'Printing
Of fice *
JY'p. ”259 - (Hereinafter referred to as Foreign
Relations-1917.)

10
reaffirmed.

He handed the following note to the American

Be ere taryi
The government of the United States well knows
that Japan has special and close relation® with
China, both political end economic. Secretary of
State Bryan recognized this fact and stated that
the activities of Americans in China were not
political In his letter to Ambassador Chinda of
March 13, 1913 . * . f because Japanese public
opinion is particularly sensitive to the problem
of China* . . ♦ rumors of the American conduct
has created uneasiness among some Japanese. For
the above reason* it will favorably impress the
general public of Japan and contribute to the
friendly relations between the United States and
Japan if the United States government re-affIrm
in some way the Bryan statement and clearly con
firm that the United State® will take a friendly
policy on China toward Japan. The government of
Japan hereby frankly expresses its beliefs and
asks the intentions of the government of the
United States,3
During the conversations and in the note mentioned
above, Sato did not distinguish between all of China and
those parts contiguous to Japan when he addressed Lansing,
and he referred quite obviously to political interests.
Lansing at the time failed to catch the significance.

He

replied that he thought the note was "in accord with the
deep sense of the memo.

Unwittingly, Lansing had played

the "straight-man11 for a Japanese maneuver to improve its
bargaining position.
^Kamikawa, 0£. Cit., pp. 336-337.
Porelan Relations-1917. p. 259.

XI
Several clays latex1 this was made patently clear to
Lansing when the American Charge d*Affairs in Tokyo# Mr*
Post Wheeler# forwarded a dispatch containing the Japanese
version of the Sato-Lansinc conversation.

It had been

translated as "Japan possessed paramount Interests both
b
political and economic in China."
Lansing informed
Ambassador Sato that his statement of June 15th was
meant "to vary in no way the formal declaration of Mr*
Bryan *

,,u

The Japanese diplomatic probe had been recog

nized and parried.
Although there is no record in the Foreign Office
microfilms as to whether this mot/e by Sato was directed
by Motono or self-initiated# it does fit into a broad
pattern of Intense Japanese activity in preparation for
the Lansing-Xshll meeting*

On June 10# 1917# Vice Admiral

Takeshita, who was senior naval member of the special
mission# received detailed instructions from Imperial
Naval Headquarters;^* on the 12th Prime Minister Terauchl
outlined his government1s broad objectives to the Foreign
% . S . , Department of State# Foreign Relations of the
United States-The Lansing Papers IWasMnglon*“"HJTS#Hsovernment
p. 430.
^Foreign Relations-1917# pp. 260-262.
^Foreign Office* Letter from Imperial Navy Headquarters
to Vico Admiral Takeshita# June 10, 1917*

Office;

8 and on the 19th, Lt. General Sugano, who repre

sented the Imperial Japanese Army, received hie complete
Instructions from Imperial Army Headquarters.^
A detailed examination of these three communiques
sheds significant light on the attitudes, sincerity and
desiderata of the Japanese government.
The June 10, 1917* letter to Vice Admiral Takeshita
from Imperial Navy Headquarters informed him that he would
have authority to assist Ishli on naval matters; that he
would soon have available for review the Foreign Office
instructions given to Viscount Ishli, and that specific
Instructions relating to naval questions were attached.
He was enjoined to do background study on unspecified
'*Important problems.11
His detailed Instructions revealed a Japan that was
ready to make concrete and rather astonishing proposals
concerning Pacific security.

Takeshita was informed that

upon request from America, Japan would be willing t© patrol
the area west of ISO degrees In the Pacific, and that
^Foreign Office, Letter from prime Minister Terauehi
to Foreign' Minister'Motono, June 12, 1917 *
^Foreign Office, Letter, Instructions for Military
Member of the Special Migslon,‘
'"InFoxmiaiTon copy'" to'Tlie
SorelgnTlSf£ice 'from" the Imperial Army Headquarters,
June 19, 1917.
lQForeign Office, Letter from Imperial Navy Headquarters to Vice Admiral Takeshita, June 10, 1917*

13
Japanese naval forces would be made available for patrol
duty in the Manila-Gusm and Hawaii-San Francisco areas If
requested*

He was cautioned not to volunteer this infor

mation, but rather he was to let America do the requesting*
In the event United States naval authorities did request
Japanese participation in Pacific security, the following
ships were to be made available:
Manlla~Guam area1 battle cruiser
12 cruisers
1 or 2 destroyer
squadrons depending
on the need.

San Francisco^Hawall area2 or 3 Tokiwa Class
cruisers
1 or 2 destroyer squad
rons again depending on
the need*-*--**

If any of these ships were required, Flee Admiral
Takeshita was instructed to obtains

United States agree

ment to use American naval facilities on a “no-red-tape”
basis! a refueling/refitting agreement where the United
States would provide supplies and Japan would pay; and
permission to use American cable/telegraph facilities if
needed *12
Concerning the sending of supplies to the Allies,
Vice Admiral Takeshita*s instructions read like those of
a naval lobbyist*

He was directed to inform the Americans

that the Japanese Navy was Immediately capable of producing
effective weapons and related military Items and that the
11Ibid
12Ibid

national arsenals were constructed to function on a permanent basis.

Along this same line, he was instructed to

endeavor to obtain access to raw materials at that time
13
denied to Japan by the United State®.
Takeshita*s instructions returned to the question of
naval vessels but in a somewhat larger reference than
earlier;
If in the Mediterranean and Pacific Areas the United
States requests more Japanese ships, the Imperial
Wavy will cooperate with the Allied countries to the
utmost; however, a® the majority of the new type
cruiser® are already in the Mediterranean and the
remaining cruiser© are In the Pacific area pro
tecting ships from enemy raiders or in for repairs,
it will be rather difficult to offer more ships*
The entire matter depends on the course of the war
and, of course, pacific security is related.1 *
Takeshita1© instructions concluded by saying that
America*s true intentions toward Japan would be Judged
through these meetings.^
Two days later, on June 12, 1917, Prime Minister
Terauehi sent very general instructions to Foreign Minister
Motono concerning the coming special mission. Q

He reviewed

the fact that a special mission was going to be sent to the
13Ibld.
l4Ibld.
^Porelttn Office, Letter from Prime Minister Terauehi
to Foreign Minister Motono, June 12, 1917.
l6 IbicJ.

15

United States to demonstrate Japan1s sincerity in America's
entry into the war, and to discuss other Important matters*
Terauehi said that it seemed as if the United States wished
to conclude an agreement on supplying goods to the Allies,
Pacific security and other thing® associated with the war.
The Prime Minister pointed out that the talks should bo used
as a means to open discussion on anything disturbing Japa
nese- American friendshipi however, he stressed especially
two subjectst

the position of Japanese in the United States
"I

and Imperial Japanese interests in China.
Under the second subject, Terauehi emphasised the need
to give? a clear understanding of Japanese Interests to the
United States, and the question of harmonising the future
actions of both countries In China.

Motono was cautioned

to use care in reaching an agreement on these two matters
as they were considered extremely critical to future Japa
nese -American relations.

The Instructions end with Terauehi

directing Motono and Xahli to get together to discuss the
matter.*®
One week after Terauehi informed the Galmusho (foreign
office) of Japan's broad objectives, Lieutenant General Sugano
17Ibld
l8Ibld

received his instructions from Imperial Army Headquarters.^
The Foreign Office received a copy of the Army1s instruc
tions through its Bureau of Military Affairs.
These instructions, dated June 19, are quite revealing.
They begin by Infoi^ming the general that he has been
selected to be a member of the special mission, and that
he is to assist the mission as necessary* he is instructed
to keep the following points in minds
a. To maintain Allied strategic capability and
also Improve it, you must know how many weapons
and military supplies are available to the United
States and Japan. Each party must understand how
it can best help in this area.
b. If United States Pacific Fleet has to move to
the Atlantic due to United States involvement in
the war, japan will take the responsibility for
Pacific security if the United States so desires.
If the United State® desires to give the Philip
pines its independence or give it or Guam to
another power In the future, Japan should be con
sulted first.
c. As a matter of policy, the Japanese Army will
not go to Europe.20
The next item (d.) la without a doubt an effort to
collect information on the mobilization capability of the
United States.

General Sugano is asked to obtain infor

mation on the following items:

the American Army plan for

deployment to Europe % and facts on the wartime expansion
^Although the addressee is not readily apparent on
the paper, I am assuming that the correspondence was
addressed to Lt. General Sugano. Foreign Office, Letter,
Instructions for Military Member of tHe spa c"faif Mi ssi on,
Information copy to Foreign Sffice, June 157 I§lT*
20

Ibid.

17
of the United States Army.

It was added parenthetically,

but nonetheless emphatically, that the Imperial Japanese
Army did not like fee have the American military functioning
In Siberia.
The information requested In these "research Items"
is most interesting*

It will be recalled that it was a

little-heId secret that the sympathies of a great number
of Imperial Army personnel were with the Central Powers.
It is conceivable that information gathered on United
States mobilisation and deployment schedules would be used
t© "cover all bets."
The point parenthetically made Is also thought-pro
voking.

Was Japanese Army opposition to American forces

moving across Siberia due to. Siberia's proximity to
Manchuria and the Japanese presence there, or was the
Imperial Army anticipating a Russian collapse and did not
want American forces readily available to fill a possible
power vacuum?

These instructions to General Sugano were

almost coincidental with the dispatch of 50*000 Japanese
21
troops to Manchuria,
The subparagraph dealing with the China situation
was so dynamic and pertinent to latex1 discussions that it
Is quoted here as translated?
eers, op. clt., p. 112.

18
0 * Japan respects all countries* business and
Industrial opportunity in China. At the same time,
Japan has a special position geographically and
historically# Malm clear Japan's special political
position in China, and the fact that Japan will not
allow any American activity In China besides
econoraicT^
CItaXle¥ TS n e .)
this highly militant section makes it clearer why the
Japanese reacted so emphatically to Lansing*s June 4, 1917
letter relative to China entering the war and to the various
obtrusive moves by Relnsch*

Evidently Japan was under the

impression that she had obtained recognition of political
suzerainty over China through the Bryan note, and was
endeavoring to have it confirmed.
Concluding these instructions in subparagraph f was
the Issue of the position of Japanese immigrants in the
United States.
Lieutenant General Sugano was ordered to make his
preparations complete for the mission, and he was further
informed that instructions would be sent to him if any
23
problems developed.
An interesting insight may be gained into the Japanese
government by reviewing these three sets of instructions.
On the one hand one observes that the Navy which was
^Foreign Office. Letter, Instructions for Military
Member of' SpecialMission, Information copy to Foreign
5 F F I c e , ^ u n e "^ f ~ l W : ----

23ibld.

19
British-trained and generally pro-ally stressed tfutmost
cooperation” in its instructions.

The Anay, on the other

hand, with Prussian traditions and considered pro-Central
Power, asked its representative to obtain Information on
present military strengths, logistical backup, mobilisation
and expansion data, deployment schedules and went so far
as to tell its representative to make it clear that the
presence of American officials in China would be tolerated
only as long as their efforts were directed towards economic
matters.

In the middle, and attempting to synthesize the

two, was the Terauchi government.

It stressed the need to

give a "clear understanding” to the United States of Japa
nese interests in China while not providing America with
a cauaua belli.
While preparations continued for instructing the
various key individuals in the intentions of the several
departments, the Galmuaho took steps to confirm the com
position of the special mission.

On the 13th of June,

Motone sent Ambassador Sato in Washington a proposed list
of attendees.^

Ishll was listed as mission head with

Vic© Admiral Takeshita, Lieutenant General Sugano, Mr.
Nagai, Commander Ando, Lieutenant Colonel Tanigawa, and
Vice Counsulor Imai as his supporting diplomatic staff
and naval/military advisors.
Foreign Office, Cable 186, Motono to Sato, June 13*
1917 (dTipitcheWy:---

20
Sato was instructed to relay this list of individuals
to the American government and obtain its approval.

The

Wilson administration had already informed Japan on May
25
31st,
of its willingness to accept Ishil, and on June
16th, Mr. Post Wheeler, the Charge d*Affairs in Tokyo,
informed the Japanese Foreign Ministry that the United
States would be "delighted* to welcome the entire mission
to the United States*^
The news of the Japanese special mission was released
to the American press, and a very~interested Sato reported
to his home government a favorable editorial which had
appeared in the Hew York World on June l6.2^
On the 5th of July, the American Secretary of War,
Mewton D. Baker, visited Ambassador Sato to discuss the
28
coming mission and specifically its itinerary.
Baker
proposed that the mission visit numerous cities on its
way from San Francisco to Washington, D.C., in order to
stimulate good relations between the United States and
Japan, but particularly to let Americans see the visitors
^Foreign Office, Cable 209, Sato to Motone. May 31,
1917.
^Foreign Office, Cable 822, Wheeler to Motono, June
i&, 1917#

0*7

'
’“'‘Foreign Office, Cable 228, Sato to Motono, June 19,
1917 (receive8).
^Foreign Office, Cable 243, Sato to Motono, July 5,
1917 (receive*!).

from the remote Orient.

He especially pointed out Denver,

Kansas City and Saint Louis as the kind of cities he hoped
Ishil would visit.

On the return trip from Washington, he

suggested that the mission visit cities on the East coast
and then take the southern route through Texas to Los
29
Angeles.
To Sato, it was obvious that the United States was
going to use the mission to stimulate the personal, involve*
ment of Its nationals in the war.

This was true with regard

to the people of the Southwest States who, according to the
Secretary of War, were very cold or ignorant of the war.
In the true fashion of any bureaucrat, Sato was reeled by
such a schedule for the Viscount, and he replied to Secre*
tary Baker that he did not like the Idea of Ishil meeting
so many people and visiting so many cities prior to his
formal introduction to the President and other high govern*
ment officials.

He pointed out that the missions of

Britain, France and other countries had visited only
twelve cities, nothing so arduous as that being proposed
for Ishil.

He, of course, did not say "yes” or "no,"

but agreed to forward the problem on to his government.30
Secretary Baker stressed the thought that the Ishil
Mission would be extraordinary, implying greater
2%bid.
3 °ibid.

32
expectations from the Japanese than from either the British
or French.

Finally, he stated that he believed the Presi31
dent would not be opposed to hi© proposal.
& reply to Sato1© report of the Baker visit was
dispatched two days later from Tokyo.

The entire matter

of Ishil1© itinerary was taken care of in a very efficient,
but typically Japanese manner.

"Ishil 1© not good at

making speeches . * . so to give so many would be diffi„32
cult for him.
For the moment, the issue rested.
On the 24th of July, five days before Ishil and hi©
entourage left for Honolulu, the Cabinet, meeting in
Council Session, decided to give further private instruetions for the Viscount.

These Instructions were for-

warded in two pieces of correspondence. The first, drawn
up In rather general terras consisted of the decisions of
the Cabinet Council and was so designated.

The second,

an attachment to the first, was a more lengthy and detailed
review of Japanese policy and objectives for the mission.

34

It was entitled simply, "Instructions for Viscount Ishil.11
31Ibld.
32Forelgn Office, Cable 219, Motono to Sato, July 7,
1917 (dTspltcReSn--33J?orelfm Office, Letter, Decisions of the Cabinet
Council on the Ishi'i Mission an<S InstructTons for Viscount
r s % r i T ~ j C T y T * T , " W I 7 .------------------------------------------------

34Ibid.
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As both documents are germane to an evaluation of the
success or failure of the mission* the present writer will
review their contents at length*

In the communique

entitled ’’Decisions of the Cabinet Council on the Ishil
Mission*w the envoy Is enjoined on four points?
1.

First* he Is directed to meet fresident Wilson

and deliver the congratulations of Japan upon the United
States entry into the war as an Ally.
2.

Second* he is advised that it appears that the

United States desires to make a pact on Pacific security
and related matters*

Ishil Is told that the Japanese

government will cooperate to the fullest extentj however,
discussions relating to this question are to be initiated
by the United States.
3*

Third* the Cabinet memorandum asks that Ishil

make Japan’s thoughts and desires on China clearly known
to the United States*

In this vein* he is instructed to

follow the more detailed directive which is attached.
4*

Fourth, the general instructions conclude

with a brief review of Japanese policy toward the German
pacific Islands occupied by Japanese forces*

As the

Japanese government is determined to obtain these islands
at the conclusion of the war* Ishil is told to indicate*
at an appropriate moment, his government’s concern that
German ownership of these Pacific islands after the war

24
would be a source of trouble In the future,

As Britain,

France and Russia had already Informally agreed to transfer
the Islands to Japan, Ishti was Instructed to most dis
creetly broach the subject with appropriate authorities.
It was felt that asking for American consent to- the
proposition would be appropriate, but Ishil was warned
to hint only at this time*^
The attached paper, referred to above In Item 3, Is
entitled "Instructions for Viscount Ishil.n

This memo

randum is quoted practically in its entirety as translatedi
The government of Japan thinks it most essential
to establish a lasting and solid international
friendship between Japan and the United States,
and wishes to eradicate all the conditions that
are feared might cause troubles in international
relations In the future* The American policies
at which the Japanese are chagrined are the
American political and economic activities in
China and the unfair and prejudicial treatment
of Japanese in the United States.
1. The Problem of American Activities In China*
American Interests In China are mainly economic,
none of which is ^ l c7 of vital Importance to the
destiny of the united States* In the case of Japan
in China; however, Japan far surpasses the United
States in capital Investment. Economically, and
politically, the Japanese interests in China are
unparalleled, and of special and vital Importance
to the destiny of Japan* Haturally, if any nation
tries to establish political influence In China in
disregard of the Japanese position and impairing
Japanese Interests, Japan will have to take
measures to defend her interests* For the above
reasons, the Japanese are particularly sensitive
about international problems concerning China*
The government of Japan believes that the United
35|bld.

States government recognises these circumstances.
It I© a matter of fact that Japan1© policy of
maintaining the 3*if pendence and territorial
integrity of China has not changed. Japan is
willing to reaffirm this policy if the United
States thinks it necessary.
Regarding the economic activities of the
United States in China* Japan has no intention
to obstruct them if they do not encroach on
Japanese special interests. A fair and Just
competition guarantees the people of the world
free and equal opportunities. Under the present
conditions in China; however* the cooperation of
capitalists of Japan and the United States will
be to the benefit of both nations and contribute
to the development of the natural resources of
China. Accordingly* Japan thinks it the best
policy for the governments of the United States
and Japan to encourage and pave the way for the
cooperation of the capitalists of both nations.
If other nations make direct contracts with the
Chinese government for such enterprises as rail
ways or mining in South Manchuria and the eastern
part of Inner Mongolia* sphere© of Japanese
influence* Japan cannot overlook It* but the
Japanese government will have no objections to
the investment by Americans In these area© under
contract with the Japanese.
2, Regarding the Unfair and Prejudicial ‘treat
ment of Japanese in the United States*
Here* the instructions review the general situation
and the relative power of the American Federal government
to take action in opposition to state laws,

The Issues

upon which agreement must be reached to prevent the
situation from becoming grave in the future are then
listed*
a. The governments of the United States and Japan
mutually give most-favored-nation treatment in
acquisition* enjoyment* exercise* and Inheritance
36Ibld.
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of real property to the peoples of both nations.
b.
Industry, trade and other vocations taken
up by the peoples shall be based on mcst-favorednation treatment.
0 . Corporations and partnerships, whose
employees and stockholders are wholly or partly
composed either of Americans or Japanese, shall
be given the same treatment in the acquisition,
exercise, and enjoyment of their real property as
other corporations and partnerships whose employees
and stockholders are wholly or partly composed of
the people of most-favored-nations.
d. This agreement shall have no effect on the
existing laws.
e. The Japanese demand for the repeal.of the
Land Law of California shall be .reserved.37
A brief recapitulation shows the intent of the authors
of these instructions to Viscount Ishil.

Japan wished to

establish ^lasting friendship11 with the United States
provided the United States practiced complete abstinence
from political activity in China, and limited her inde
pendent economic activity to areas not encroaching on
Japanese special interests.

It was clear that the special

interests of Japan included the Shantung area, Manchuria,
and Inner Eastern Mongolia.

In these areas the United

States was asked to submit to what amounted to Japanese
management of American investments.

Friendship between

the two nations was also contingent upon American removal
of prejudicial treatment toward Japanese living in the
United States, and upon legally granting them the same

37Ibid.
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business and real estate privileges as were then granted to
the most-favored-nat ion *
These Instructions, coupled with the more- general
directives, leave little doubt that Japan was preparing
to use the diversion caused by America's entry into the
European War to remove the United States as an effective
force from China,
To present these desiderata the Japanese government
selected one of their most able and experienced diplomats,
Kikujiro Ishil was fifty-one years old.

He had graduated

from the Law School of the Imperial University of Tokyo
in 1890, and had been engaged in diplomatic activity
almost continually since then.

He had held various posts

with the Japanese Legations in Paris, Minsen, and Peking!
and had been First Secretary of the Foreign Office, Chief
of the Telegraph Section and Director of the Commerce
Bureau*

In 1907 during the serious outbreak of anti-

Japanese trouble along the West Coast of Canada, and the
United States, he was sent to San Francisco and Vancouver
to help settle the difficulty*

He was made Vice Minister

of Foreign Affairs in 1908* and during the same year
started a tour as Ambassador to Paris,

During 1915*1918

he had acted as Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Okuma

28

governmen

Baron In 1912, and was

The Terauchi government had selected one of Japan*a
most qualified diplomats to capry out the special mission,
and had vested him with plcntipotentlal and extraordinary
power
On the 26 ch, three days prior to the mission*© depar
ture, Motono sent Terauchi a letter for his approval to he
sent from the Emperor to President Wilson*

The letter,

addressed to Yoshihito’s wD@ar Friend,” was a letter of
introduction and accreditation for the V i s c o u n t I t
is quoted here in full as a remarkable example of a bygone
age
Oreat and Oood Friendt
Animated by the most lively feelings of satis
faction
at the entry of the United States
into the arena of war on the side of Justice, 1
extend to you, and to the Nation over whose destines,
under Providence, You preside, My sincerest wishes
for the speedy victory of Our common cause.
Engaged Myself in the vindication of that cause,
and in the battle against the inhuman submarine war
fare waged upon the innocent, I have directed the
^During this period ha established a diplomatic dia
logue with representatives of the Central Powers in Peiping
and Stockholm.
^Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The
Imperial Japanese Mission tothe United States, 1917
XraiRXngtons Pres¥oF"Byron S A ' J a m s T * pp. T-2.

V

^Forel&n Office. Letter from Motono to Terauchi with
one attachments better to President Wilson from Emperor
Yoshihito, July 26, 19IT.

29
Viscount Xahii, My late Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs, to proceed to Washington as My
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at
the head of a Special Mission charged to convey
you My sentiments of congratulation upon the
momentous and chivalrous decision taken by the
United States, as well as My earnest wishes for
the advancement of those relations of true friend
ship between our two nations which are always very
near my heart*
The knowledge which I have of the Viscount
Ishil1s fidelity, his seal for My service, and his
eminent talents, as well as of the other high
personal qualities which in an especial degree
distinguish him, convinces Me that he will accom
plish to My entire satisfaction, the honourable
and special mission which is entrusted to him,
and that he will neglect nothing in order to
merit Your confidence and esteem*
I therefore request that You will give full
credence to whatever he shall communicate to You
in My name, more especially, when he shall express
to You My constant wishes for Your happiness and
for the prosperity of Your country, and shall assure
You of the profound esteem and invariable attachment
with which I am,
Great and Good friend
Your sincere friend,
Sign Manualt
Imperial palace, Toklo,
the twenty-sixth day of the seventh month
of the sixth year of Taisho* 1
With this, all preparations for the mission were com
pleted*

At 12:32 P*M* on Sunday the 29th of July, the

Ishil Mission departed Tokyo Station for Yokohama and the
TIOC steamer Korea Maru.

The mission was seen off by a

host of notables Including Admiral Count Togo, Count
Terauchi, Baron Goto, Admiral Kato, General Oshima,

41Ibid

Viscount Motono and the American Charge d 1Affairs Mr* Poet
Wheeler*

At 3*00 P.M*, amid streams of multicolored tape,

the mission steamed on its way for Honolulu.**2

Japan Tims a, July 39, 1917.

CHAPTER III
OH TO WASHINGTON- AUGUST, 1917
On August 6, 1917# at lliOO A.M., Ishil and hi© party
arrived in Honolulu, and received, in the words of The
Japan Times, a "genuine o v a t i o n . T h e territory of
Hawaii reportedly received official United States instruc
tions to accord the Ishil Mission the "treatment due to a
state guest."2

Evidently, Governor Bingham and the resi

dents far exceeded the requirements of these instructions.
Ishii1© speeches and hi© activities while in Hawaii were
given wide coverage and extremely favorable comment in
the Pacific Commercial Advertiser and the Honolulu StarBulletin*^
Consul Morol of Honolulu was so pleased at the
reception given Ishii that he forwarded a seven-page
report to Foreign Minister Motono in which he especially
stressed the value of the trip to the Japanese residents
of Hawaii.**

While in Honolulu the Viscount and party

*The Japan Times, August 8, 1917.
2Ibld., August 1, 1917.
^Foreign Office, Letter, Consul Morol (Honolulu) to
Motono, AugustI6, I917 (received September 3j 1917}*
h
Foreign Offloe, Itinerary of Viscount Ishil, undated.
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stayed at the Young Hotel;® they were given the thrill of
visiting the historic Huuanu Fall before the hasty eon&
tlnuatlon of the trip on August 7th*
On August 13# 1917# the lorea Man* arrived off San
Francisco*

Traveling In a United States Navy launch* an

official welcoming party went out to meet the mission.
This party consisted of Mr. Breekingridge-Long, Assistant
Secretary of State; Mr. Calvin McNap, leader of the Demo
cratic party in California and Chairman of the San Fran
cisco Reception Committee; former Consul to Seoul, Mr.
Miller; United States Navy Captain March; United States
Army Colonel Iron; and other local military officials plus
British Consul Boss and Japanese Consul Uehara.^
Upon the mission*s arrival, they war© taken t© a
"monster reception” at City Hall where the reaction of
p>
the people was spontaneous and sincere.
The party was
housed at the Saint Frmnci® Hotel.9
% h a Young Hotel is still in operation in Honolulu,
but the habitat of less distinguished visitors.
a
Foreign Office» Itinerary of Viscount Ishil, undated.
^Foreign Office, Letter, Uehara to Motono, August 17,
1917,
Q
The Japan Times, August 15, 1917#
^Foreign Office, Letter* Uehara to Motono, August 17,
1917*
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On the evening of the 14 th, Ishil gave a speech to a
gathering of 600 local citizens at the Grand Hotel, the
first of numerous speeches he made throughout his stay
in the United States.

A quotation from a speech given

at a banquet staged by the citizens of San Francisco on
the evening of the 15th ie typical of the type of speech
made by Ishil, as he crossed the United State®.

But he

did vary this theme later when he Introduced the MonroeDoetrine-in-Asia idea*
My mission is a mission of peace and good will*
I have come here at this very important time in
order to confer on some important problems of
common interest to Japan and America* It may be
said that I have com© as an ally, in that I have
brought to your, shores the guarantee that the
Japanese people will closely co-operate with your
country in this great war. Your country Is on
the side of Justice and right, and th© welcome
extended to the Japanese special mission indicates
that Japan and America are friends with each other
in peace and trade, and also means that their
interests and their civilisation are common and
equal. Your country has shown to the world that
America prefers humanity to love, to happiness,
to wishes, even to the extent of the sacrifice
of lives.*0
One interesting aspect of the official reporting by
both Japanese counselor officials of Honolulu and San
Francisco was their obvious amazement at the intensity,
spontaneity, and general nature of the welcome given
Ishli.

Morol In Honolulu was extremely impressed as

•^The Japan Times, August 18, 1917*

3^
was Uehara in San Francisco*

Uehara pointed out that the

numerous guest lists were well planned (a compliment to
Mr. McNap), and all segments of the society including
workingmen1a representatives were present at the official
functions,

Uehara summed up his impressions by reporting

to Motono that the welcome would surely help kindle better
American*Japanese relations **^
After four days of magnificent receptions by the city
of San Francisco, the Ishii Mission left by special train
12

for Yosemite.

The group departed Stockton, California,

at dawn, on the 18th of August for Washington, B.C., which
they reached on the 22nd*
After their arrival in Washington, the members of
the mission embarked on a demanding schedule of official
functions Including formal presentation of the Viscount’s
credentials on August 23rd to President Wilson, dinners,
speeches, wreath*laying, and tours**-3
In Ishilfs own account of the trip and negotiations,
Diplomatic Commentaries, he wrote at length about his first
conversation with President Wilson*

Ishil said that the

Foreign Office, Counsel Uehara to Motono, August IT,
1917 (received September 11, 1917).
^Bobert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing
(Indianapolis and New York:The'
s*MerrilX Company,
1935)0 P. £90.
13Ibld.
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President introduced the subject of China, and indicated
that American desires for that area encompassed only the
nfaithful observance , , . of the open door and equal
14
opportunity principles/1
Wilson further stated,
according to Ishii, that the introduction of spheres of
Influence by various powers was disturbing him, and that
these spheres were interfering with the complete attainIS
merit of the mentioned principles. ^
Ishil, relieved apparently that Wilson had brought
up the subject of China first, quickly pointed out that
the spheres had been introduced by Germany and .Russia,
and that Japan ”. * * has never failed to uphold in it
spherg7 the principles of the open door and equal
*1g
opportunity *M '
With that exchange the meeting was concluded except
for an invitation to Ishii on the part of Wilson to carry
on these conversations with the Secretary of State
Ishii, so he states* returned to his hotel and sent
a cable to Tokyo recommending that the Torauchi government
agree to the abolition of spheres of Influence for the
^likuiiro Ishii, Diplomatic Commentaries, translator
W . Langdon (Baltimore* TPheT'oHns Hopkins ftrei'a, 193^),
p. 112,
iSlshll, op. cit., p, 112.
l6Ibld., p. 113.
x7ibid.
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obvious reasons that Japan could raalce creator progress
commercially- in China than any of her European or American
competitors primarily due to the factors of inexpensive
labor and location*

Thus* Japan stood to gain rather

than lose if the spheres were renounced*

10

Ishil did. not hear from the Japanese government on
his proposal as the question had been turned over to the
Foreign Affairs Investigation Council and received a
generally hostile reception*

He eventually tired of

waiting and prepared to open discussions with Lansing
on his own Initiative*^
Before beginning a description of the negotiations
between Lansing and Ishil, we must pause for a moment to
consider one further issue that was of great interest to
Ishii and the Japanese generally, that of the steel/iron
embargo*

Mo reference to this problem was made in Ishii*s

personal instructions; however, the naval representative*
Vice Admiral Takeshita, had received general instructions
to look into the problem.*

It must be introduced here as

much of Ishil9s preliminary talks were related to the
20
embargo*
l8n i a „ pp. 113- 115.
•O l b l d .. P. 115.
The matter of the iron/steel embargo hit the Japanese
with great impact* During the month of August, the Japan
Times devoted an unusually high degree of coverage to the
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Arrangements had been made for the United States to
complete shipment of half of the 400,000 tons of steel on
order when the embargo took effect*

It was up to Ishii to

obtain release of the remaining 200,000 tons and make
PI
arrangements for the future.**
In regard to this matter,
Ishii dispatched two messages from Washington prior to
his first business meeting with Lansing*
In a cable received by the Oalmusho on August 27,
Ishii reviewed the attitudes of the American public toward
the special mission.

22

He evidently believed that the

general consensus was that the mission had been sent to
satisfy the “selfish interests of J a p a n * He thought
problem, some of which tended on emotionalism* Generally,
the Issue revolved around the fact that Japanese consumption
of Imported iron was projected at 600,000 tons for 1917*
{From the Japanese language newspaper Yorodzu***translation
of the article appeared in the Japan Time a1'
1'''on August 26,
1917*) It was reported that JapanTs capability to produce
Iron without drawing on American resources would be a
meager 30,000 tons. Against this, the desire to use
1/SOth of America's reported annual production of 40,000,000
tons appeared to the Japanese as no serious drain* The
American objectives of the ban were reported to bes 1.
Stop fluctuations in the steel market; 2* Stop Japanese
shipments beneficial to the mmmy; 3* Encourage Japanese
shipping available in the Atlantic to aid the Allies;
4. Fear of Japan winning a fins position in the marine
world If further exports are allowed; 5* A United States
attempt to check the prosperity of Japan. {Primarily
from the Japan Times, August 26, 1917*)
21The Japan Timas, August 23, 1917.
Op
Foreign Office, Cable 315# Sato to Motono, August 27#
1917*
23Ibid.
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that, with such mistrust, it would be better to start
negotiations on a problem mutually profitable for all
sides.

Such a problem was the steel embargo question.

Once negotiations had started he would wait for an appro
priate time to introduce the question of China and the
position of Japanese immigrants in the United States.2^
Having decided that this would be his course of action,
he realized the determination of the United States not to
export steel plates for shipping except in support of the
war effort#

In a message to Motono, received in Tokyo on

the 30th, Ishii stated that the term "war purposes" or
"war effort" was not too clear, and that he would need a
more explicit definition by the United States*2^

Ulti

mately, he Insisted, the meaning of war purposes must be
left up to Japan*

He recommended that the embargoed

materials be obtained under a "war purposes" clause and
later used as necessary,'

(A most interesting insight

into Mr, Ishil1s concept of diplomacy,)
Start of the formal talks between Lansing and Ishii
had been postponed due to the Secretary of State’s pre
occupation with the preparation of a reply to a Papal
24ibia,
2^Foreign Office, Cable 322, Sato to Motono, Ishii 8,
August 30># I9I7 (received).
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peace note.2^

Ishii, however, was quite occupied as he

visited Arlington Cemetery to see the tomb of Dr. Stevens,
a one time advisor to the Japanese Foreign Office,2^
addressed the Senate on August 3Gth2^ and the House of
Representatives on September 5th3® and then had some
quiet visits with the British Ambassador,3*
His speeches before both legislative bodies were well
received.

Before the Senate he stressed the selfless

nature of Japan* s involvement in the war, 32 and In the
House he warned against intrigues aimed at sowing dis
sension between Japan and America. 33

For a man who

^couldn’t speak too well” he was certainly leaving his
mark and he was generally aiding his cause.
On the 3rd, the British Ambassador visited Ishii as he
returned from his summer vacation. 3^
27

He indicated that

The Japan Times, September 4, 1917*

2 e ibld.,

September 2, 1917*

2% b i d ., September 5, 1917*
3Glbld., September 9, 1917*
3*Foreign Office, Cable 328, Sato to Motono, Ishii 9,
September "6, T 9W Ireceived) .
S^Foreign Office, Iahii’s Speech Before the Senate,
Film 4787
--------- ------- ----------------------^Foreign Office, Ishii*s Speech Before the House of
Repre sent ali ve aZ "ffitlm 484 .
3^Foreign Office, Cable 328, Sato to Motono, Sep
tember 6,
9 (received).
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Britain was prepared to talk with the Americans on Japanese
desires relating to the Pacific Islands and China as the
British wished to do everything necessary to prevent a
Japanese-American rift.

Ambassador Spring-Rice said that

the Japanese position with respect to these matters was
correct.

He was of the opinion that the United States

had no vital interests at stake on these subjects,
especially those relating to China.^
The British Ambassador cautioned Ishil that he may
run into trouble with Lansing over the China question as
the American Secretary was related to John Foster, a man
greatly interested in China*

Sprlng-Rice advised the

special envoy to be persistent in these areas since nonrecognition by the United States of Japanese Interest© may
only be Lansing*s personal bias.36
Ishil inquired if the American government was aware of
the Telnsien and Stockholm peace talks between Japan and
the Central powers*

Spring-Rice assured him that they were

and that he had received all the accounts of this matter
from the United States government and none from London*^
On the 5th, the day prior to the first formal talks
between Lansing and Ishil, the special ambassador once

35Ibld.
36Ibld.
37Ibld.

again met with the British Ambassador*^

At this meeting

the two discussed China and the possibility of pushing for
American recognition of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine over
China.

The British envoy did not believe that the American

government could go that far.

Official cognisance of the

Japanese position In China may be gained, but he did not
think it possible that the Wilson Administration would
publicly admit a Japanese Monroe Doctrine for China.

The

British Ambassador did state that his government was trying
to explain the Japanese position to the Americans*39
Armed with this confidential advice, the Japanese
special envoy met the next day in Foggy Bottom with Robert
Lansing.

During the first part of the two-hour session

questions of Japanese participation In the war and possible
ways of more complete cooperation with the Allies and the
United States were discussed. *IQ Lansing suggested that
Japan could possibly supply more ships for commercial
purposes.

As Ishii had Intended to discuss the iron and

steel embargo problem initially and move on to the China
question, Lansing*s first comments fitted conveniently Into
the Viscount*s preconference plans.
^Foreign Office, Cable 332, Sato to Motono, Sep
tember B , T ^ jL?, IshlI 10 (received).
39Xteid.
°Lansing, op. olt.. p. 290.
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Ishil related the entire question of shipping to the
United States embargo by saying that Japan*s ship building
program was restricted because of the embargo*

Lansing in

his account of the meeting records that the subject was
reviewed in detail by the two.

An understanding was

reached that some-kind-of system would be appropriate
which would incorporate steel shipments to Japan in
exchange for the use of Japanese merchant ships by the
Allies.41
In a supplementary report submitted by Ishil to the
Terauchi government, and received in Tokyo on September 9*
1917, Ishil pointed out that Lansing inquired whether the
Japanese government contemplated sending troops to Europe.
Ishil stated in the report that he had replied in the
negative and that Lansing had responded by indicating
agreement or understanding, and finally that the American
had said Japanese troops in Europe might seem a bit strange. ^
As the day*s conversations progressed, Ishii stated
that ”it would be unfortunate not to consider some of the
other questions as we had to look forward to a time when
the war would toe over.11^

Ishii then told Lansing of

4 libia.

^ F oreign Office. Cable 336, Sato to Motono, September tF,‘19it, fshll 13 (received).
^Lansing, op# clt., p. 291.
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Germany1s peace feelers of 1916*

He mentioned that the

Germans had approached Japan three times In an effort to
44
draitf It away from the Allied camp*
Lansing, certainly with tongue in cheek replied
11* * * that it was a matter of no concern to this govern
ment, in view of the fact that Japan1s loyalty to an ally
and her reputation for good faith was too well established
to be ever suspected.
The special envoy also informed the American Secre
tary of the Japanese talks with the British,^ and the
fact that Sir Edward Grey had apparently approved the
Japanese retaining the Pacific Islands north of the
Equator.^

Ishil commented that returning these islands

to Germany after the war would be against the Interests
of humanity.'
Lansing replied, “Yea, that*s r i g h t . H o w e v e r ,
was noncommittal as to who should get them.
44Ibid.
ft5jbid.
Foreign Office, Cable 333# Sato to Motono, Sep
tember 8,1 19I?ff shlT 11 (received).
^Lansing, op. cit., p. 291.
^Foreign Office, Cable 333# Sato to Motono, Sep
tember B 7 W , T s H I T 11 (received).
49Ibid.
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The two diplomats turned their attention to a con
sideration of China; this subject was to occupy most of
their conference hours until negotiations ended.

In light

of the propaganda accusing Japan of inactivity in the
European war and great activity at the expense of China,
Lansing proposed a joint declaration*

Such a manifesto

would stress the two governments1 respect for the terri
torial Integrity of China as well as the principles of the
50
open door and equal opportunities*
Lansing described Ishii as "taken back” by the
suggestion*"^1

A term possibly more close to Ishii*s true

reaction might be exasperated*

The Japanese envoy replied

that such a declaration already existed, specifically the
Root-Takahlra Agreement of 1908.

A restatement of these

Ideas was to Ishii*s thinking valueless and could be
misinterpreted by the Japanese people as a manifestation
of America*s mistrust of Japan*

He stated that

”* * . m y

government must avoid creating any such misunderstanding
among the Japanese people.

I cannot persuade myself,

therefore, that a joint American-Japanese declaration
such as you have suggested is appropriate at this
time . . . »52
^Ishil, 0£. clt *, p. 116.
51
^ Lansing, op* cit.* p. 291*
52lahii, 0 £. cit*, pp. 116-117*
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He could have added, but did not, that such a decla
ration did not satisfy his instructions*

The Viscount

went on to state that a Joint declaration must contain
^something new and different** to make It significant *

He

proposed that the old agreement of 1908 be reaffirmed, but
that a "statement defining Japan’s relationship to China
• • • be added to it to allay misinterpretation by the
Japanese people,H53

The definition of Japan’s rela

tionship t© Ovtna, Iahll suggested, could be based on a
recognition of Japanese Interest In China which is quite
similar to that of the United States in Central America,
as manifested in the Monroe Doctrine*^
Ishll pointed out that Japan’s special interests in
China arose from "the arrangements of Mature" and need
not be recognized by the various states; however, these
Interests had been made a matter of record in the AngloJapanese Treaty of Alliance, the Franco-Japanese con
vention and the Busso-Japanese agreements*

Ishii explained

that "under certain circumstances ***** such recognition
could be beneficial*55
At this point, as recounted in the Xshil memoirs,
Lansing stated that the discussion had "unexpectedly

53Ibld.. p. 117.
* w
5!W
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assumed a very serious aspect11 and he (Lansing) asked that
the meeting be adjourned to allow time to study the
proposal
In Ishli* s official communique to the Foreign Office,
a slightly different account is available.

He reports that

after a slight hesitation Lansing said that "the American
government understands Japan* s position in China, but the
American people would not.

He further advised that the

United States could only point out Japan*a geographical
position In a declaration.

At this time Lansing suggested

that consideration of the matter be postponed till the
next meeting which was scheduled for Monday the 10th of
September.^
In the Lansing version of the first meeting, we
observe a somewhat more dynamic and aggressive Secretary
of State*

Rather than asking for adjournment of the

meeting after presentation of Ishii* s proposal, Lansing
replied that as Japan* s Interests were a direct result of
her geographical position, the sources of her interests
were natural and not political.

Lansing Insisted that

such a declaration would not be germane to a reaffirmation

56Ibid.
^Foreign Office, Cable 333, Sato to Mot one, Sep-*
teraber B , T § T f ,''Ishii 11 (received).
e-Q
^ Ibid.
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of the open door and that It might be miainterpreted as
referring to primarily political interests.
Lansing pressed his rebuttal by pointing out the
advantages Japan had by recognising the open door as
opposed to the older system of spheres of influence.
Japan, by complete adherence to the open door, would
have great commercial advantages in China due to her
geographical location and cheap labor*

Lansing stressed

that a return to the spheres of Influence after the war
would restrict Japan far more than free commercial
competition*

He then ended the first session stating

that he hoped Ishii would be willing to discuss the
So
proposal further at the next meeting.
The reasons for the omissions and slight differ
ences in emphasis can be attributed to the fact that
both individuals wrote their accounts some years after
the negotiations, were writing for native consumption,
and in defense of their own positions*

Rather than

stress these differences in partisan text, I will try
to add, where possible, to their accounts to give a
somewhat clearer picture of the negotiations than is
provided by either of the two principals.
^Lansing, op* cit., p* 292.
^°Ibld

.

On September 8th, two days after initial discussions
with Lansing, Ishii once again visited the British Ambas
sador who appeared more and more to be Ishiifs primary
foreign confidant and advisor.

During this meeting the

two discussed the attitude which the American government
would take concerning the mission*

Ambassador Spring-Biee

held quite strongly that the United States would take
China's side on negotiations*

He said the Chinese were

quite wary of Japanese ambitions on the mainland, and
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would be distraught at any Japanese conference success* x
Ishii explained that he would push for the abolition
of spheres of Influence.

He thought it not difficult for

Japan to adhere to the open door as in free competition
she could develop commercial preeminence in the area#®**
To this plan the British Ambassador was none too
receptive*

H© remarked that repudiation of the spheres

might be good for Japan, but not necessarily for Britain.
He sighted specifically some railroad concessions held
by British nationals in the Yangtze Eiver area as reason
for probable British nonconcurrence ^

61
tember

^Foreign Office, Cable 334, Sato to Motono, Sep
,"Tahii 12 (received).

6aIbid.
M«*For©i.jgn Office # Cable 339, Sato to Motono, Sep
tember W , ~ 1 § X 7 7 1 sKl'i 14 (received).
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The two diplomats once again discussed the problem of
Japanese ownership of the German Island© in the Pacific
north of the equator.

Evidently, Ishii had been quite

optimistic on this point, but he began to have reservation®
as a result of the day1® conversation®•

Sprlng-Kice

explained that there was "still some difficulty” on this
64
matter.
On the 10th of September Ishii met Lansing for the
second time.

In the published accounts of the negotia*

tions, the tenth I© written off as a day when "nothing
»*.■ occurred I ^ nouever, « v e r . I venr lnt.re.tlns I t . ™

need to be recorded.

Lansing, in Ishii*& report to Motono,

said that he was still "in the thinking stage11 on a joint
statement concerning China and the open door.

Ishii said

that as no instruction© had been received from Tokyo, he
also wished to defer till later conversation on that
particular issue.

The two wont on to a discussion of

a request for Chines© troops for the European war, forms
of financial assistance to China, and the Bryan*Chinda
Agreement.
^Foreign Office, Cable 334, Sato to Motono, Sep
tember $»' Ishii'J12 (received).
^$Lansing, op. cit., p. 293.
Foreign Office, Cable (unnumbered), Sato to Motono,

September""12, XSOT"Ishii l6 (received).
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Ishii showed some obvious interest in Lansingfs remark
that the Chinese had been asked to send, troops to Europe.
He eousiiented that the sending of large numbers of troops
would impose a logistics problem and the dispatch of a
few would be valuable for morale purposes only.

Ho

stated that engineers, light and heavy infantry would be
of value.^
The conversation turned to a consideration of various
ways to assist China financially*

bansing said that the

Onlted States would "gladly11 give loans to China*^®

He

mentioned that China had asked that payment of the Boxer
Indemnity be postponed and that the current Import tax be
Increased.

The American Secretary of State indicated that

the United States Intended to recommend that these requests
be followed.

Ishii replied that he would need Instructions from
Tokyo to comment meaningfully on the loan matter, but he
would say that the request for an Increase in the Chinese
Import tax would be favorably considered by the Japanese
government even though it would be an Imposition on
70
Japanese civil enterprise.
67Xbld.
68Ibid.
69Ibid.
' Ibid.
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The meat significant point of the September 10th
talks was then brought up by Ishii, and it concerned the
treatment of Japanese living in America.

Ishii stated

that he thought the time was appropriate for recon
sideration of disclosing the terms of the Bryan-Chinda
Agreement*

This convention, evidently aimed at preventing

or Inhibiting anti-Japanese legislation In the various
states, had been agreed to by Wilson, but never released
to the public.

Lansing stated that he was aware of the

agreement, but wanted time to research the matter and
reply.

With that, the second meeting came to an end.^l

710n the matter of the Bryan-Chlnda Agreement, I must
point out that my research, to date, has failed to yield a
text or a concrete subject. X was able to determine that
in January, 1913, the 40th Session of the California Legis
lature had prepared thirty-three separate bills or regu
lations restrictive to Japanese residents in California.
The California State Attorney General, a man by the name
of Webb, consolidated these proposals into one bill which
became known as the Webb Bill. Ambassador Chinda received
instructions from the Japanese Foreign Office to meet with
Bryan (then Secretary of State), and to register Japan1s
concern. This occurred In April, 1913* As a result of
the conversations, President Wilson sent a telegram to
Governor Johnson of Californla requesting his assistance.
The California governor promptly took a state*s rights
stand, replying that land laws were state matters and
not the responsibility of the federal government. Bryan
was sent to California to stop passage of the bill, but
did not succeed as with only minor amendments it passed
both houses and became law on August 10, 1913* All
evidence points to an accord of some kind between Secre
tary of State Bryan and Ambassador Chinda, but I cannot
be any more specific as of this date. Zaldan Hojin Kikoku
Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jin Yo iCai, fflchlbe Bunka Koshoshl
(Tokyo, Japan; Yoyosha, 1964/65)'T pp*rT 4 1 4 ’
6.

A heartening indication of the success of the mission
was seen in an article of the Washington Post*

On Sep

tember* 10th, the paper editorially took the position that
Japan should be exempted from the steel embargo.

The

matter was highlighted in the Tokyo press as it was
reported that the post had been until recently antiJapanese.*^
Tokyo*s keen interest in the question of the steel
embargo was reiterated to the special envoy in a massage
dispatched on September 12th from Motono*

The Japanese

Foreign Minister stated that ff. . • Japan has a vital
interest in its outcome, ** and prompted ishii to keep
Tokyo informed by forwarding results of the conversations
as they occurred.*^
The urgency of this matter to the Japanese is further
indicated in a recapitulation of Ishii*s activities pre
pared by the Japanese Embassy and forwarded to Tokyo on
September 15th*

In this summary it was reported that

American officials were hinting that the United States
was contemplating cutting all needless expenditures to
save economic resources and shipping for the war effort.
7% h e Japan Times, September 14, 191?*
^Foreign Office, Cable 302, Motono to Sato, September I ^ 7 T | i r r W T s h l i 3 (sent).

The Japanese diplomats were quick to pick up tlw implication
that Imports of raw silk and silk px'oduets might be stopped*
To avert this economic calamity* Sato t o commended that

japan "decide to let the United States use presently owned
*7 It

Japanese ships’* to prosecute the war * 2

On the 12th* Ishii had visited the Shipping Depart
ment* and had been briefed on United States steel plate
production *^

He was informed that the recently expanded

United States production capability would be 2,6 million
tons per annum*

Ishii reported to Tokyo that this figure

conflicted with the one of 3*5 million tons obtained by
a Japanese shipping agent in New York*

Ishii as iced the

President of United States Steel Corporation* Elbert H.

Gary, to explain the discrepancy*

Gary identified the

3*5 million figure as only wa dream without any fact*H^
It was about this time that the Japanese realised
that although tonsing had talked freely on the embargo

problem* he did not have authority to make a decision on
the matter.

The Japanese Embassy* through Ambassador Sato*

called upon the Export Committee and Shipping Department
^Foreign Office* Sato to Motorio, Recapitulation of
Vi sc ouriFTQhii *5 ''le'H vi tlea* Compiled Seple®eF*T57^9T7«
^Foreign Office* Cable 36fo* Sato to Mo tone* Sep
ta mber 2'3* 1917'*’TsKIl 21 (re ce 1 vad) .
7hbld.
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which evidently did have responsibility for determining
embargoed items^
Sato9a preliminary talks yielded wishful thinking in
the vein, that if the United States shipbuilding program
were cut back* the savings In steel plate could be sent to
78
Japan*
In a report of this meeting Sato reiterated
American determination on this issue, and stated that it
“will be difficult to establish private contacts" with
them*

The Ambassador emphasised the need to share

presently-owned vessels in the face of the United States
desire to cut expenditures as imports of Japanese silk
could be at stake.

He concluded with a plea to Tokyo to

stop sending so many messages and appeals concerning the
yo
embargo as "they show our desperation*Wf^
Ishii spent the period from the 15th

to the 21stof

September giving speeches in Philadelphia, Newport, Boston
and Washington.

He addressed, among others, the Chamber

of Commerce and the American Academy of Political Science
in Philadelphia, the Massachusetts Legislature and Boston
^Foreign office, Cable 3^3# Sato to Motono, Sep
tember 1f>, i^77"~£s5Ii 18 (received).
78Ibld.
79Ibid. At this
point we will ceaae to follow the
BmbargoHFroblem as it has become a matter to be dealt
with by Ambassador Sato and his staff. It no longer
receives Ishii *s attention.
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City Club in Boston, and the National press Club In Wash
ington, D.C.^®
While Ishii was occupied with his short speaking tour
to East Coast cities, result® of talks between the Japa
nese naval member of the mission, Vice Admiral Takeshita,
and the American Chief of Naval Operations were cabled to
Tokyo*

Takeshita reported that in a meeting on the 8th

of September, the Americans had revealed certain planned
changes In. the disposition of their naval forces*

The

cruisers Saratoga, Galveston and Cincinnati were to be
transferred from the Philippines area to the Atlantic,
and five destroyers were already on their way to the
Atlantic from the Philippine Station*

The United States

asked that these force alterations be offset by having two
Japanese cruisers in the Philippines area and one in the
vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands*

United States patrol

craft In the Pacific off the West Coast were considered
adequate and augmentation was not requested.^1
The Assistant Naval Minister, Toehluchi, in a reply
to Vice Admiral Takeshita stated that the Allies expected
the Japanese Navy to do its utmost in the Pacific area*
Office, Itinerary of the Viscount Ishii,
Film.
^Foreign Office, Cable 1533# Assistant Naval
Minister ^o^hluchi 'to Deputy Foreign Minister Hidehara,
September 17, 1917 (received)*
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As It was Japanese policy to concentrate on Pacific prob
lems, he asked Takeshita to get a clear plcjfcure of American
intentions in this regard*®^
Tochiuchi replied to the request for augmentation of
naval forces quite positively*

The cruiser Tok^wa was

being mad# available for Hawaii duty and the First
Special Destroyer Squadron with the cruisers Yagurao,
Yaha&l and Yodo was to be placed on Philippine patrol*®®
Whan Takeshita returned to inform the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) of the latest Japanese offer, he was told
that America appreciated the Japanese Navy1a kind gesture,
but that only the Saratoga would need replacing*

Evi

dently the British had indicated a strong desire that
American naval forces remain in the Manila area*
wish was acceded to by the United States*

This

The CNO

expressed the hope that in the North pacific tight
security could be realised through close JapaneseAmerican cooperation.

The Americans informed the

Japanese naval representative that they wished to talk
further on this before his return home.

The Japanese

offer for ships for Philippine duty was held open.
Op
Foreign Office, Cable Unnumbered, Tochiuchi to
Take sh lEa’
, 'unda?e
83Ibid.
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Takeshita indicated that it was up to the Americans if
84
they were to be used or not,
On the 22nd of September at 3?00 In the afternoon,
Ishii met Lansing for their third working meeting*®-**
Ishii stated that his government did not 'want to get
Involved in any action that might upset the status quo
in China#®®

The possibility of an agreement on the

spheres of influence thus became remote•
Lansing then asked about & declaration on the open
door to which Ishii replied that he could mate no such
statement unless it recognised In some manner Japanese
special Interests*

The American Secretary of State

stated that the United States would recognize Japan's
economic interests, but that paramount Interest and the
open door policy were mutually exclusive ideas.
Ishii replied that the Japanese government did not
have any particular awareness cf the word paramount*

He

thought that the United States itself had paramount
^Foreign Office, Cable 3, Japanese Naval Attach© to
Naval Mini atry, September 22, 1917; and Undated letter from
Acting Secretary of Navy (F* D. Hoosevelt) to Lansing,
0P-9-B*
^Lansing* og>* cit*, pp* 293-^94.
®®Foreign Office, Cable 361, Sato to Motono, Sep
tember 35*_iy i?7 tshli 22 (received).
87m d .
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interests in Mexico* and that the open door policy did not
seem to conflict with paramount Interests there
"The United States does have special interests* hut
doesn’t demand paramount interests*1 argued the Secretary.^
"if you don’t like paramount interest" Ishii replied*
"we can use special interest as an alternative."^0
Ishii* according to Cable 331, then defined what he
meant by special Interest.

As this is particularly critical

to later developments* hi® remarks are quoted practically
verbatim.
Japan will be satisfied with the recognition of
Japanese special interests in China, if not
preeminent Interests. However, in order to avoid
misunderstandings, I should like to explain the
meaning of special Interests. A civil war or
collapse In China may not have any direct effect
on other nations, but to Japan, it will be a
matter of life and death. A civil war in China
will immediately be reflected in Japan, and the
downfall of China means the ruin of Japan. On
the above ground, Japan cannot rest reassured
for her self-defense unless China is well gov
erned in defense and public security. Japan
thinks it her duty, therefore, to dispatch mili
tary officers to keep peace and order In China
within the limits set up by the necessity of
maintaining the independence of China.91
88Ibid.
89Ibid.
9°Ibid.
9^Ibld. and Kamikawa, op. cit., p. 345. It certainly
seems quite clear that Ishii is not making reference to
economic special interests, and that he has defined Japa
nese Interests In China bordering on a "right to Intervene"
in order to maintain a government friendly to Japan.
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Lansing commented that the United States was not
against other countries sending; advisors to South American
countries*

f,Als© In China, if that country needs advisors,

not only Japan, Britain cr France, but even the United
States should take part in this.w

The Secretary indicated

that in China the predominance of one country would stifle
QO
equal opportunity. *“
Xshli, evidently warming up by this time, replied
that the Chinese government did not have enough power to
govern, and that Japan1a relationship was one of life and
death.

He then openly said to Lansing:
It seems you think Japan Is attempting to assume
power In China; If you think this way, you don1!
comprehend the Japanese position . * « Japan has
always respected the expressed statement and the
Implied spirit of treaties. Certainly It ^aparj7
doesn1t give you any suspicion • . . .93

Lansing replied that he had always been deeply
Impressed.with Japanese fidelity in international rela
tions.

He stated that he understood the Intention of the

Japanese government and that he would draft a note which
would Include a statement on Japanese special Interests,
fh© Secretary indicated that he would obtain Presidential
approval and then pass the note to Ishii.^
^Foreign Office, Cable 3^1, Sato to Motono, Sep
tember 1^5*19i7'(received).
93Ibld.
94Ibld.
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Lansing concluded by stressing the need for solidarity
between the United States and Japan*

He said, ’*At this

moment, to publish a declaration is important to make
Germany realise that there is no room for Germany to
alienate Japan from the United States*”95
Ishii replied, ”lf you complete a draft, 1*11 study
it anytime gladly.
The Lansing account of this meeting, as recorded In
his memoirs, again differs slightly from the Japanese.
Lansing writes that Ishii suggested the redeclaration of
the open door.

In this conversation Lansing pointed out

that the United States and Japan were the only two powers
capable of taking advantage of the European war by acting
In China*

He stated that Japan and America must 11dispel

the Impression that vie would selfishly seek to take
advantage of their

European national wasted con

dition . * **'97
Ishii in his reply, according to Lansing, pointed out
that the Japanese public would hold the Terauchl government
accountable for agreeing to a declaration which did not
mention Japan's special interests.^
9&Ibid.
96Ibid.

^Lansilng, op. c i t ., p.
^Ibld

.

29k.
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Lansing's answer to this was categorical.

If Ishii

meant by "special interests," paramount interests then the
matter would not be further discussed.

However, if the

special interests referred to or could imply those
interests arising out of geographical position, Lansing
would consider a declaration.^

According to Lansing,

Ishii then asked him to prepare a draft declaration for
consideration.100
The Lansing memoirs state that at this meeting the
American Secretary tried to clear up the "misconception
of the underlying principle** of the Monro® Doctrine
That it was not an "assertion of primacy or of paramount
interest by the United States in relation to other American
republics; that its purpose was to prevent foreign powers
from interfering with the sovereign rights of any nation
102
in this hemisphere*11
Ishii made no mention of this lecture in his official
cables regarding the conference
In a second cable covering the events of the 22nd of
September meeting, Ishii did report that Lansing still
"ibid.
100Ibld.
1Q1Ibld., p. 295.

102Ibid.
^O^Forelgn Office, Cable 372, Sato to Motono, September W 7 T ^ 7 T * T s H r i 23 (received).
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.had not had sufficient time to research the Bryan^Chinda
Agreement, and that he had no comment on It*

He also

informed Tokyo that Lansing wanted him to stay in the
United States "if at all possible" until a declaration
could be decided upon#1^
This meeting on the 22nd seemed to qualify as one
during which H. . . the conversations frequently became
excited and lost their c o h e r e n c e a s Ishii later wrote
in his memoirs.

Out of what must have been a rather

lengthy and heated session came the agreement that a
draft declaration would toe prepared toy Lansing,

Little

els# seems to have been accomplished save a rather com
plete exchange of views on the open door, Japanese special
interests in China, and the "true" meaning of the Monroe
Doctrine,

The lasting significance of the day's exchange

on the two principals seems questionable since both, in
recording their memories, chose to ignore practically
all tout their own parochial arguments.
Keen Tokyo interest in the status of the BryanChinda. Agreement was reflected in a cable from Motono
dispatched on the 25th of September,
104Ibid.
10^l8hil# op. cit.. p. 122.

In it, Motono
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asserted that realization of this agreement had been desired
for many years by the Japanese government*

He encouraged

Ishii to "work hard for lt.*,a,c^

r

1
0
6
Of flo e * Cable 325# Motono to S a to , 3eptember 2 T T W ," ¥ o ~ T 5 h ll 6 ( s e n t).

CHAPTER IV

THE DRAFT
On the morning of the 26th of September, Ishii
received a draft declaration from Lansing*

It was for

warded to Tokyo by cable and was received there on the
28th.1
The following Is the text of the first draft:
I have the honour to communicate herein my
understanding of the agreement reached by us in
our recent conversation, touching questions of
mutual Interest to our Governments relating to
the Republic of China*
Charges have repeatedly been made of late,
some accusing the United States, and others
Japan, of seeking to take advantage of present
world conditions to acquire political influence
or control in China, The Governments of the
United States and Japan, having always recognized
China as a sovereign and independent state, and
having repeatedly declared that they consider
foreign interference In China1s domestic political
affairs to be violative of Chinese sovereignty,
.resent such accusation as offensive and as wholly
unjustified.
In order to silence such mischievous report
/slc7, however, it Is believed by us that public
announcement once more of the desire© and inten
tions shared by our two Governments with regard
to China Is advisable*
The Governments of the United States and Japan
recognize that territorial propinquity creates
special relations between countries, and conse
quently the United States Government recognize
^Foreign Office, Cable 377* Sato to Mo tone, September SB, l§lf , Ishii 24 (received).
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that Japan has a special relation to China, par
ticularly to that part to which her possessions
are contiguous, for participation by the citizens
or subjects of all nations having treaty relations
with China, In the commerce and in the economic
and industrial development of that country, and
that they will not take advantage of present con
ditions to seek special rights or privileges In
China which would abridge rights of citizens or
subjects of other friendly states. Moreover they
mutually declare that they are opposed to acqui
sition by any other Government of any special
rights or privileges that would affect independence
or territorial integrity of China, or that would
deny, to the subjects or citizens of any country,
full enjoyment of equality of opportunity in the
commerce and industry. Territorial sovereignty
of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired, and
the Government of the United States has every
confidence in the repeated assurances of the
Imperial Japanese Government that in enjoyment
of such special rights, they have no desire to
discriminate against the trade of other nations
or to disregard commercial right heretofore granted
by China in treaties with other powers.
The Governments of the United States and Japan
deny that they have any purpose to Infringe in any
way Independence or territorial integrity of China,
and they declare furthermore that they earnestly
desire faithful observance throughout all China of
the principle of the so-called-open door or equality
of opportunity of China.
They furthermox*© agree to bring this declaration
to the attention of other interested Governments,
and invite those Governments to give their adherence
to these declarations.
I shall be glad to have Your Excellency confirm
this understanding of the agreement reached by us*
(Signed)2
Ishii met Lansing on the afternoon of the 26th to
discuss the draft that had been received that morning.
^Foreign Office, Cable 377, Sato to Motono, Saptember"'""S87 l§lf, Ishii 24 (received).

At
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this meeting the two negotiators agreed to make the fol
lowing changes;
1*

In paragraph two, they agreed to delete the

words f,and having repeatedly declared that they consider
foreign interference in China’s domestic political affairs
to be violative of Chinese sovereignty.”
2.

In paragraph four Ishii wanted to change, “Japan

has a special relationM to “paramount" or "pre-eminent /Iic7
Interest in," but Lansing did not agree.

The two finally

settled on "special interest in China."
3.

Also in paragraph four, they changed the words

"particularly to that" to "particularly in."
4.

Finally in paragraph four the words between

"Japanese government that” and "they have no desire" became
"while geographical position gives them special Interests."
5.

In paragraph five, the two agreed to substi

tute "always adhere to principle of so-called open door or
equal opportunity for commerce and industry In China" where
"earnestly desired1' began.

This particular sentence, used

in the Root-Takahira Agreement, was Inserted at Ishii1a
insistence as he felt If he didn,t, Tokyo would; Lansing
agreed,^
Ishii reported that after agreeing on the listed
changes, Lansing asked for a two hour recess In order to
2Foreign Office, Cable 361, Sato to Metono, September“28, 1"?IT, Isliii 2% (received).
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obtain President Wilson's approval.

After this recess the

negotiators met again, and Lansing informed the special
4
ambassador that Wilson had approved the draft.
In the cable which forwarded these changes to Tokyo,
Viscount Ishii made it pointedly clear what h® thought h©
had achieved from the negotiations thus far.

. this

proposal recognizes Japan's Monroe Doctrine toward China.
It is doubtful if the Monroe Doctrine has ever been
defined strictly In economic terms.

Certainly Ishii was

not of the opinion that he was bargaining for United States
recognition of Japan's economic preeminence In China.

This

fact, that Ishii was out for more than recognition of eco
nomic interests, must have been patently clear to Lansing
especially in light of the changes Ishii recommended to
the draft.

The deletion of the phrase "and having

repeatedly declared that they consider foreign Inter
ference In China's domestic political affairs to be
violative of Chinese sovereignty,H and the change from
"faithful observance throughout all China of the principle
of the so-called open door" to the innocuous statement
"always adhere to principle of so-called open door" must
have indicated Ishii's Intent.
^Ibld.
5Ibld.
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Ishii forwarded several additional dispatches to
expand on the September 26th meeting with Lansing*

He

reported America*a willingness to lend up to ten million
dollars to China; the fact that the Chinese intended to
sand troops to Europej some background information on
paragraph six of the draft declaration; and a few remarks
on the term "special interests*"
With respect to the question of large loans to China,
the Japanese envoy inquired about Chinese intentions and
capability to repay*

Lansing Indicated that the Chinese,

as a matter of principle, had the right to obtain loans
from the United States if they ordered military goods.
As to repayment, Lansing said that there was still certain
6
room for negotiations.
Concerning Chinese troops in the European theater,
Ishii showed considerable surprise at China1s determination
to send troops to Europe In the face of north-south dis
sension verging on civil war.

He indicated that trans

portation of the force to Europe would be the major
problem and would be quite expensive.

Lansing observed

that If Japan furnished the ships it would be a real
contribution to the war effort.^
^Foreign Office, Cable 383, Sato to Motono* Sep
tember" £8,'u^l?, ishii 27 (received).
7Ibld.
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The rationale for paragraph six of the draft decla
ration was also forwarded to Tokyo*

Evidently, ProBident

Wilson felt strongly about its inclusion.

According to

Ishil, Wilson was particularly interested In presenting a
united front to Germany, and was concerned that a bilateral
agreement between Japan and America be coordinated with the
Allies,

In this cable, Xshii stated that it might be

appropriate for Japan1© special interests in China to be
approved by all the Allied Powers.
a
agreed with this idea.

Lansing reportedly

Ishil1s comments on the choice of the term "special
interest” are Quite interesting.

The Viscount explained

In a brief cable that as Lansing would not agree to
"paramount” or "pre-ejnenient*

i&7 as the English to

express Japan's relationship to China, the words "special
interests" were chosen.

Ishil thought that these words

were vague and required soma-kind of explanation.

In

fact, Ishil held that the term seemed strange In diplo
matic language.^

In his memoirs, Lansing write© at length, on the
reason for his choice of "special interests."

It seems

he found the two words to contain less political overtones
o
Foreign Office, Cable 384, Sato to Motono, SeptemberTSS,fel ?» IsHli 28 (received).

9Foreign Office, Cable 385, Sato
28, I§l 7 , IsHii 29 (received).

tember

to Motono, Sep-

TO
than "paramount,* "pre-eminenttt or "special relations., ”
and accordingly sought their inclusion.

Lansing states

that he made the Japanese special representative "fully
u n d e r s t a n d t h a t the term related only to Japan* s geo
graphical position and her commercial Interests
Obviously, Lansing was splitting semantic hairs and
was not as fully understood as he thought.

Xshii*b message

makes this quite clear.
On this same day, the 26th of September, Xshii had a
half-hour private talk with the President.

Although he

does not report to Tokyo on subjects discussed during
this conversation, aside from the fact that he told Wilson
he was going to New York,^3 we can gather from Ishil*s
memoirs that this particular session was none too suc
cessful.

He mentions that Wilson was suspicious of Japan

and imagined it was opposed to the open door and to
equality of opportunity in China
10Lansing, oj>. cit., p. 296.
n JMd.
^ F o r eign Office, Cable 385# Sato to Motono, Sep
tember 26, 191?',' ’¥ sH 11 29 (received).
^ F o reign Office, Cable 3B2, Sato to Motono, Sep
tember ^ 7T 9T?TTiHIi 26 (received).
^Ishil, op. cit., p. 118.
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On the 27th* Ishil left Washington for New York and
a series of public appearances and speeches.

He sent the

Secretary of state a letter informing him of his departure
from the capital and thanking him for all the courtesies
thus far extended*

16

During this seven day sojourn In Hew York* the repre
sentative of Japan made at least seven speeches to a variety
of audiences ranging from the Japan Society to the Hew York
State Chamber of Commerce•

The most notable of the

speeches from a controversial point of view was the one
given on the 29th of September at the Waldorf Astoria
Hotel.

18

The occasion was a dinner given in honor of

Mr. Xshii by the mayor of Hew York, John Purroy Mttchel.
Ishil spoke at length on Japan's position vis-a-vis China,
This relationship as outlined by Ishil was interpreted in
the

press,^

and Justifiably so, as the declaration of a

Japanese Monroe Doctrine toward China.

The Viscount in

part said t
^Foreign Office* Cable 381, Sato to Motono, September SB," I9I7V'''I'SKi'i 25 (received).
1

Foreign Office, letter, Ishil to Lansing, Sep
tember 27, I9I7 # Slim 526.
^Foreign Office, Itinerary of Viscount Ishil* Film
550 and 553.
l8Ibld.. Film 556.
^ T h e Japan Times, October 6, 1917,

J2

. . , circumstanceb for which we were in no sense
responsible gave us certain rights on Chinese
territory but at no time In the past and at no
time in the future do we* or will we* seek to
take territory from China or to despoil China
of the rights. We wish to be and to always
continue to be the sincere friend and helper
of our neighbor for we are more interested than
anyone else except China in Good Government
there* only we must at all times for self pro
tection* prevent other nations from doing what
we have no right to do. Hot only will we not
seek to assail the Integrity or the sovereignty
of China* but will we
eventually be pre
pared to defend and maintain the same Integrity
and independence of China against any aggressor.
For we know that our own landmarks would be
threatened by any outside invasion or interference
in China.20 {Italics mine.)
The speech is valuable as it sheds light on Ishil1s
own interpretation of Japan's position in Asia.

More

important* however* the special ambassador probably used
the speech as a means to determine the public temperament
on the issue.

The reaction was sufficiently keen so that

two days later at a dinner at the St* Hegis Hotel* Ishil
pi
qualified and clarified his remarks.
. . . I find that this utterance of mine is taken
as the enunciation of a MMonroe in Asia*M 1 want
to make It very clear to you that the application
of the terra "Monroe Die trine "
to this
policy and principle* voluntarilyoutlined and
pledged by me is inaccurate.22
20Foreign Office* Viscount Ishii's Speech at the
Waldorf -Astoria'tfote!* September 29* 1917* Film 556*
^ F o r e i g n Office* Speech at St. Regis Hotel, Film 578.
22Ibid.
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The Viscount went on to point out that the policy
he had outlined bound Japan to observe certain voluntary
restrictions such as respect for China’s territorial
integrity* equality of opportunity and the open-door*
Japanese action in China,, he pointed out* would thus be
far more restricted than similar United States activity
21
in the Americas.
Ishil stayed in Mew York until the 3rd of October
at which tiros h© departed for Atlantic City and a slight
respite from the demanding schedule of the past week.
On the 5th of October he returned to Washington and
stayed at the Willard Hotel
While Xshii was in Mew York* Vice Admiral Takeshlta
informed Tokyo that it had been decided* after consultation
with both Lansing and Ishil* to release a statement on
naval cooperation between Japan and the United States
at the same time that a diplomatic note was publicized.

In

the pacific it was noted that agreement had been reached
between American naval official© and the Japanese naval
representatives who accompanied Ishli.

One phase of the
25
Ishil Mission apparently was concluding successfully. ^
g3f»oy©jgn Office. Viscount Ishil’s Itinerary* Film 553*
24Ibid.
2^ForelF,n Office. Cable 1670 (Secretariate), Assistant
Naval Minister TocHTuchl to Assistant Foreign Minister
Hidehara* September 29* 1917*

74
The strain of the mission, was beginning bo be felt by

the Viscount because on October 3rd, he recommended that
the visit be concluded,

lie reported that the American

people had formed a good impression, and he feared that
a further stay would only increase the risk of ruining
26
achievements to date.
On October 7th, Ishil received Tokyo*m comments on the
draft declaration.

The Galmusho felt that the draft was

generally acceptable, but recommended several significant
changes,

paragraph two which dealt with accusations against

United States and Japanese opportunism in China was deleted
from the Japanese counterdraft in its entirety.

Motono

stated that its inclusion would only result in criticism
and misunderstanding and implied that detailed coverage in
such a declaration would tend to give validity to the
accusations.

As It "dealt merely with f a b r i c a t i o n s , h e

recommended the paragraph be deleted and paragraph three
changed to meet the requirements of the new text.

In this

relation, Motono thought that paragraph three should be
changed to read, ,fIn order to silence mischievous reports
^ F o r e i g n Office, Cable 182, New York Counselor Yada
to Foreign M i n i K S F H o t on© , October 3# 1917# Ishli 31
(received).

^Foreign Office, Cable 34?, Motono to Sato, October 6
1917# ^ " i S E i T 5 (sent),
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that have from timo to time been circulated it is
f|28

.bolvevei
*. ,

.

.

.

.

The vjorda 11special interests?! thaw gave Xshii such
a time seem to have equally baffled the men at the Foreign
Office,

The cable from the Oaimusho stated:

"This terra

is flexible as well as bound leas*11 In studying this term,
Motono and his staff found it used in a British cable
dated the 12th of January, but slightly expanded.
words "and influence*1 had been added.

The

Accordingly, Tokyo

recommended that "special interests and influence” would

be more clearly understood without hurting the original
meaning*

It was requested that this item be brought to

Xanaing’s attention.®®
Xshii was told to delete the phrase, also in paragraph four, "The territorial sovereignty nevertheless

remains unimpaired*”

This statement was held to be mis

leading and casting an impression that japan Intended to
infringe upon China’s territorial sovereignty#

The Foreign

Office considered that respect for China’s territorial
integrity and independence would be covered adequately
in draft paragraph five *30
28Ibid.
g9jbid.
3°Ibld.
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Two portions of paragraph four were cited as being
indicative to a third party of '*some-kind-of argument
the United States and Japan,,f*^ and did not seem

between

in keeping with the current good relations between Japan
and the United States*
lowing phrasers in

Motono requested that the fol

the fourth paragraph be

deleted*

* . . and that they will not take
advantageof
present conditions to seek special rights or
privileges in China which would abridge rights
of citi&ens or subjects of other friendly

states

*

*

«

*

* * * they have no desire to discriminate against
the trade of otter nations or to disregard commer
cial right heretofore granted by China in treaties
with other Powore*32
Hot only
he reiterated

did Motono ask that these passages be deleted,
his feelings fey saying that

they should,

"definitely be deleted."*^
In regard to paragraph six, Motono instructed Ishli
that 11at least" the phrase "and invite those Governments
to give their adherence to these declarations" should fee
delated.

He indicated that he was not completely happy

with the first part of the paragraph as it might put some
of the powers in a difficult position1 however, he would
not object to its inclusion.^
31I b l d .
3gI b l d .
33I b l d .

Ibid.
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In reviewing the draft declaration, Motono stated
that as compensation for making a statement on respect for
Chinese territorial sovereignty, the open-door, equal
opportunity, eb cetera, the United States should in turn
admit Japanese special interests in China*

The Japanese

position as reflected in the latest changes, in Motono*s
opinion, could not he compromised further*

"This is the

limit, so think of it that way" was the Foreign Minister* s
advice to Ishil.^
Motono concluded his cable to ishil by reminding him
of Japan*s existing agreements with Britain and Russia
concerning Chinese policy.

He pointed out that it would

be proper to notify them privately before consummation of
the United States-Japanese notes,

Ishil was asked to

pass this point along to Lansing.^
The Japanese special envoy met Lansing to discuss
this latest dispatch on the 8th of October,

In his report

of the meeting Ishli said that the item concerning expan
sion of "special interests1* to "special Interests and
influence" and the request for deletion of the phrase
"territorial sovereignty nevertheless remains unimpaired"
had been submitted to Lansing,

35Ibld.
36xbid.

They were taken under
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advisement by Lansing as lie wanted to have one day to
tillnk the matter ovar,^
Ishil indicated that the “they will not take advan
tage " clause of paragraph four caused him considerable
anguish*

He reported that he repeatedly explained the

Japanese position to Lansing on this item and that finally
the American Secretary agreed to think it over*

It was

Ishil#s candid opinion that Lansing would finally agree
to its deletion*33
1*h@ unexpected intransigence on the part of Lansing
and the Americans concerning some of the Japanese revisions
was explained by Ishil as traceable to two major points*
From a private source, identified only as a Mr* Miller,
Ishil states that he learned that the original draft as
proposed by Lansing had taken the State Department by
complete surprise*

Evidently, reported Ishil, State

Department officials had not expected Wilson and Lansing
to go as far as they had* 39
Wilson was also extremely disappointed over the
absence from the draft declaration of any reference to
the problem of spheres of Influence in China*

Ishli

^Foreign Office, Cable 422, Sato to Motono, October 10,
1917* Ishli
(received)*
38Ibid.

39ibid.
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stated that he and Lansing caae to the conclusion that
Wilson did not congratulate the special envoy on the draft
note whan the two met on September 26th, because of his
unhappiness over this matter.
■Th.a Japanese Special Ambassador feared that because of
the absence of a statement regarding abolition of spheres
of influence, the entire declaration was endangered.

He

held that doubt as to Japan* s intentions would be created
if recognition cf Japanese special interests were demanded,
without agreeing to abolish spheres of influence.***
Ishil made one other Interesting point In this cable
In relation to statements of respect for China1© terri
torial Integrity*

He did not necessarily agree with

Tokyo's request to delete the statement on unimpaired
territorial sovereignty*

He astutely pointed out that

Japanese recognition of Chinese territorial integrity
could be "profitable in the future."

"For instance,”

Ishli continued, "military and police functions are
very important; however, they are not related to Chinese
territorial integrity and are part of phases of protecting
Japanese special interest©.”

With great insight, Ishil

observed that "• . . Lansing didn't say Chinese political

4oIbid.
41 Ibid.
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independence, he said specifically Chinese territorial
integrity.
To Ishil1s observations and suggestions, Tokyo
replied in a message dispatched on the 10th that the
revisions as previously suggested were carefully con
ceived by the Japanese government and represented its
position.

He was encouraged to continue to try to obtain
i!
the desires a© detailed In the previous communication. J
In the Lansing account of the meeting on October 8th,
one observes a slight divergency.

Lansing indicates he

rejected the addition of "and Influence*1 to the term
uspecial I n t e r e s t s , A c c o r d i n g to Ishli, that occurred
at a later date.
On the 10th, Lansing and Ishil met for another working
meeting.

Lansing informed Ishil that the deletion of para

graphs two and six had been approved, as well as the change
to paragraph three.

However, the two changes requested in

paragraph four dealing with opportunism and trade discrimi
nation in China were held critical to the declaration, and
the United States would not agree to their deletion.

Ishil

reported that the matter was even discussed In detail with

^3puxvlgn Office, b&blo
1917, To Ishli i'6 (sent).
^Lansing,

ojg, cit ., p. 298,

Motono to ooto, October 10,

8l

President Wilson, but to no apparent avail.

"The American

government," continued Ishil, "wants these points admitted
by Japan.”45
At this session, Lansing asked that the "other" in
paragraph four in the phrase beginning with "acquisition
by any other” be deleted.

Ishil apparently agreed with

the suggestion, but stated in his report that It was diffi
cult to determine Lansing1s rationale for the suggestion
as the American Secretary did not give any obvious reasons.
The special envoy reported that on this matter, Lansing had
made up his mind and was not inclined to change. 46
The two also discussed the matter of releasing the
notes to allied powers.

Lansing wanted to give a copy of

the agreement to each allied country with a representative
in the United States, and release It publicly the day
after.

Ishil commented to the Foreign Office that as

England, France, Russia and China had representatives in
Japan, they should probably be told.

Both Lansing and

Ishil agreed that distribution of these advanced notes
should be based on the desires of both countries. ^
In the Lansing record of this day's session, one does
not receive the impression of strong American opposition
^Foreign Office, Cable 427, Sato to Motono, October 10,
1917, Ishil 5f (sent).
4 6 Ib ld .

^7Ibld

.
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to deletion of the section dealing with opportunism*
Certainly the sense of urgency which is found in Ishii' s
cable concerning this phrase 1® absent from Lansing's
version.

If they deleted this portion, Lansing stated,

the two powers would be missing a great opportunity to
48
demonstrate their lack of self-interest.
Ishli,
according to the Lansing memoirs, Indicated his appre
ciation of Lansing's logic, but intimated that the
political situation in Japan dictated

expediency.*^

Lansing countered with a minor quid pro quo, saying
that If the section were deleted, the word "other” had
better be removed from the next sentence to make the
declaration more acceptable.*^
In summing up the exchange over this matter Lansing
said:
, * . while I would have liked to see the elimi
nated phrase retained, I considered that to
exchange it for the elimination of the word
"other” was a good bargain.*1
It was Indeed a good bargain as the sentence without
"other” read, "Moreover they mutually declare that they
are opposed to acquisition by any /other/ Government of
**®Lanslng, op. elt., p. 299.
49lbld.
5QIbld.
p, 300.
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any special rights or privileges that would affect indeco
pendence or territorial Integrity of China, - * .
This change would have seriously restricted Japan's
position vis-a-vis the gains made as a result of the
Twenty-one Demands of 1915* and might have put similar
restriction on Japan's post-war plans.
Further instructions for the Viscount were cabled
from Tokyo on the 12th of October.

Motono stated that

"by all means11 Ishii should seek the deletion of the
section beginning "and that they will not take advan
tage."

He also Instructed Ishii that it was alright

to agree to Lansing's strong desire to delete the word
Mother" from the phrase "acquisition by any other
53
government.,f
On the 12th of October, in Washington, the two
negotiators met again.

This meeting, according to Ishil,

was specifically devoted to discussions of the two items
Introduced by the Japanese representative on the 10th,
namely the possibility of adding "and influence'’ to
"special interests*5 and deleting a reference respecting
China's territorial sovereignty.-^
^ F o reign Office, Cable 377# Sato to Motono, Sep
tember 28, iy17, 1shli 24 (received).
^Foreign Office, Cable 358, Motono to Sato,
October 12, l§l7# fo Ishii 11 (sent).
^Foreign Office, Cable 435# Sato to Motono,
October'13, ityif, tsHii 40 (received).

Lansing, soon made it clear that "and influencew would
net he added to the declaration.

The American Secretary

said that "influence” was incorporated into nspecial
interests#i? and more importantly, if added would add to
confusion and misunderstanding.

He reiterated to Ishii

that the reason diplomatic notes were to he exchanged
between the United States and Japan was to establish
"perfect” understanding between the two countries*

The

injection of such a phrase would be contrary to the pur
pose of the meeting* and, as such was the case, the
American Secretary would not agree.^
On the subject of deleting the phrase "territorial
sovereignty nevertheless remains unimpaired” from para
graph four, Lanaing asked for further time to think about
it.56

In commenting about the day*a encounter, Ishii
reported to Tokyo that the American attitude on the
addition of "and influence" was very firm.

Ishii thought

the position so firm, in fact, that he recommended that
the point be dropped as Japanese insistence would be
unprofitable and indeed might Jeopardize the entire
declaration.^
55lbld.
56lbid.

57Ibid.

According to the Lansing memoirs, Ishii had promised
him on the 10th to e&bl? Tokyo concerning the section "and
that they will not take advantage of present conditions to
seek; special righto or privileges in China which would
abridge the rights of the citizens or subjects of other
friendly states."^®

This apparently was done on the 13th.®®

Ishii tried ones more to change Tokyo*s mind as Lansing had
tied deletion of this section to deletion of "ether” from
the sentence, "Moreover they mutually declare that they
are opposed to acquisition by any other government of any
special rights or privileges that would affect the inde
pendence or territorial Integrity of China.
The Viscount carefully drew Motono*s attention to
the fact that the clause dealing with opportunism would be
in effect as long as "present conditions" existed.

Thus,

Ishii pointed out, although binding and restrictive for
the moment, as soon as the war ended its efficacy would
be concluded#
In commenting on Lansing*s quid pro quo, Ishii
pointed out Its long term nature, and the fact that it
^Lansing, op. cit., p. 299*
^Foreign Office, Cable 437, Sato to Motono, October 13*
1917* Ishii 41 "('race
6oXuid.
6lIbid.
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would have the effect of making Japanese special Interests
meaningless.

If "other” were deleted, the sending of

Japanese military advisors to China might prove impossible*
Ishii concluded his very concise review of the Issue by
suggesting that Japan should restrict Its activity during
the immediate future and admit to the restraint of the
section in question.

To do otherwise would tie Japan to

an indefinite commitment ftso clearly unprofitable *
Discussions continued on the 13th. 3

The two diplo

mats again reviewed In detail the question of deleting
"territorial sovereignty remains unimpaired” from para
graph four.

Lansing said the United States would agree

to Its omission, but that in view of President Wilson1s
desires, respect for China*s territorial sovereignty
would have to be Indicated by the addition of "sovereignty”
to the phrase "territorial integrity of China."

Lansing

recommended it be added right after "integrity.”
Ishli did not like the idea, and observed that the
phrase in question had been used originally in the RootT&kahira Agreement and to now add "sovereignty” would
create misunderstanding.

In his report, Ishii once again

62Ibid.
Foreign Office, Cable 439, Sato to Motono, October 13,
1917, Ishli 4& (received on the 15th).
6^Ibid.

8?
recommended to his government that "territorial sovereignty
remains unimpaired” be retained as it appeared In the
original draft.

He thought that its Inclusion could be

profitable to Japan, and then all the American countersuggestions could be disregarded,®-*
After discussing the above change, Lansing and Ishii
moved on to a reconsideration of the self-denial phrase
"they will not take advantage#”

Ishil*s report reveals

that he indicated Japan's continued desire to have it
deleted from the declaration.

Lansing replied that to do

so, three conditions would have to be met.

The word "other”

would have to be deleted as discussed before.

"They mutu

ally declare” would have to be changed to "they severally
declare,11 and "in the same way” should be added after
"they are opposed*”

He then Indicated initially that the

deleted section might appropriately be placed in a secret
88
note.

*

Ishii* s own views on this section of paragraph four
were unchanged.

He reiterated his opinion to the Ter&uchi

government as was detailed in cable 422.

To change the

original draft on this section would prove unprofitable
to Japan.

As far as the new conditions were concerned, he

recommended only that the government think about them.^

65rbld.
6,6Ibid.
67Ibid.
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Ishli concluded his report of this meeting with a
lengthy review of his deteriorating relationship with
Lansing.

Ishii observed that since he tried to add "and

influence" to the declaration, the American Secretary of
State’s attitude had become stiff and hard.
at least, conversations were strained.

He felt that,

Ishii stated that

he had indicated a need to see President Wilson, but Lansing
had informed him of Its impossibility.

The Viscount warned

that in the present atmosphere, bargaining had practically
ceased.

"If now we miss this opportunity, It will be

extremely difficult to settle■the Chinese problem between
America and Japan.

So, even if seme difficulties and

68
disadvantages exist, we should exchange official notes.11
The Foreign Ministry replied to Ishil’s message on the
15th of October*

Motono acceded to certain of the special

ambassador’s arguments, and agreed to retention of the
phrase "territorial sovereignty remains unimpaired.M
However, concerning the phrase, ,}They will not take
advantage," the Foreign Minister was adamant, and main
tained that it should be deleted.^
Several days later, the Viscount dispatched a message
which placed particular emphasis on Lansing’s scheme to
^Ifald
Cable 366, Motono to Sato, October 15
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exchange secret notes to supplement the public declaTO
ration.
Ishli reviewed his initial reaction and said
that he had not Indicated to Lansing any particular feeling
on his proposal*

However, the Japanese special ambassador

pointed out to the Galmusho that he was really at a loss
to formulate an effective argument to counter Lansing's
latest proposition*

“So,w he continued, "I'll have to

indicate approval of the secret note idea.”

Ishii stated

that If he did concur, he would make one more try to get
Lansing to agree to the retention of ”other” in the para
graph four phrase Hany other government *”

Ishii asked for

instructions and a draft, in the event the government
71
decided In favor of exchanging secret notes*
Motono replied with unusual rapidity and clarity*
Ishii was not to agree to the idea of secret notes as
Motono insisted it would foe impossible to keep them
secret*

Their existence would be leaked to the public,

and then the significance of the contents would foe
exaggerated without basis.

In addition, the Minister for

Foreign Affairs mentioned that there always existed the
possibility that Germany would use these notes as a
means to separate Japan from America.

He Insisted that

^Foreign Office, Cable 444, Sato to Motono, October 18,
1917, I s h i l 43 (received).
71Ibld.
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the entire concept was out of place in view of the present
good relations between Japan and America*^
Ishii was told to try to get Lansing to agree to a
sltirple deletion of the section beginning nand that they

w i l l not take advantage” and in return ”other” could be
deleted from ’'any other government. ”

Motono*a tone

reflected exasperation as he concluded the message with,
,rI hope this satisfies him*

Desire that you finalise

this note*11^
Armed with these rather definitive instructions,
Ishii met Lansing on the 20th to resume discussions*

He

explained the disadvantages Inherent In an exchange of
secret notes, and submitted that as an alternative,
Japan could agree to deletion of "other” and then in
*Th
compensation, there would be no secret notes.*
Lansing replied that the deletion of 11other” was a
necessity indicating that its use as a barter item was
^ F oreign Office, Cable 372, Motono to Sato, October 18,
1917# To lahfl IS '(lent) *

73ibld.
"^Foreign Office, Cable 452, Sato to Motono, October 21,
1917# IsHil '% '(received). The date of the meeting in this
cable ia listed as October 17thj however, this is believed
to be a typographical error. Lansing lists a meeting on
the 20th, Ishil*s itinerary, as found In the Foreign Office
Microfilms, shows no meeting on the 17th, and the message
Itself was received In Tokyo on the 21st. All evidence
Indicates a meeting on the 20th rather than the 17th*

not to be considered.

However, he did say that he would

talk to the president on this point.*^
lahii relayed the change in Tokyo1s attitude con
cerning the phrase "territorial sovereignty remains
unimpaired •11 Lansing agreed to its retention, and
informed Ishli that he was dropping the idea of adding
sovereignty” or "sovereign rights" to that paragraph
Finally, the Japanese envoy proposed that the "them"

in the phrase "geographical position gives them” he made
more specific.

Xshii suggested it be amended to read

"Japan," but Lansing simply said
At the next negotiating session on the 22nd, the
American Secretary of State notified the special envoy
that the United States would not Insist on secret notes,
and would be satisfied If the Japanese would furnish some
special memorandum explaining the deletion of the section
concerning the two nations* self restraint in China.^
Ishlifs cable to the Foreign Office relates how he
explained the Japanese position so many times to Lansing
TSlbid.
7 6 Ib id .
7 7 Ib ld .

'"Foreign Office. Ca
able 456, Sato to Motono, October 23
1917, Ishil 43 ''(received)
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regarding a simple deletion of the section in return for
deletion of "other,11 but Lansing was unmoved.*^
Evidently President Wilson was insistent that some
form of written record exist declaring that Japan did not

intend to take advantage of the war in Europe to further
its aims in China*

Ishil recognized this and recommended

to Motono that to continue debate over the subject would
certainly increase doubt as to Japan*s protestations not
to use the war for self advantage*®^
At the meeting on the 22nd, Lansing gave Ishil a
draft of a memorandum to cover the self denial section.
Ishli indicated to Motono that the final portion of the
draft memorandum was "not very Interesting and he wanted
it d e l e t e d * Lansing promised, Ishil reported, that
the memorandum would not be leaked to the press, but would
be kept secret In his files.

The American draft was

reported as follows?
Confidential Memorandum to Accompany the Reply of
The Japanese Government.
In the preliminary draft Note, dealing with
questions relating to the Republic of China which
are mutual interest to Japan and the United States,
and which on September 26th 1917 were/was(?)
submitted by the Government of the United States
to the Government of Japan for their consideration,
there appeared, following the declaration by the

79Ibid.
80Ibid.
8 3-Ibid.

two Governments of their adherence t o the so-called
“open-door” policy, a further declaration that
“they will not take advantage of present conditions
to seek special rights and privileges in China
which would abridge rights of citizens or subjects
of other friendly states*”
For certain reasons of expedience which have
been orally explained to the Government of the
United States, the Government of Japan considered
it to be unwise to include above quoted, declaration
in the proposed note, and it was therefore stricken
out by mutual consent*
In order, however, to avoid misconstruction
being placed upon this amendment of the not#, the
Government of Japan desire to affirm that by so
doing there was no purpose, on their part, to
assert a contrary ,,/JElg/principle or policy, and
that the elimination of the declaration has no
significance whatsoever In determining the terms
of the Note as finally agreed upon by the Govern
ment of His Majesty*
(Signed)82
Foreign Minister Motono replied to Ishil*s latest
cable and the draft memorandum on the 26th of October*
Viscount Motono repeated his feelings about the undesir
ability of such a document, but noted that, HIf America
doesnft bend her position, at the final point we may have
to agree

Motonofs mood seemed extremely Irritable as

he chided the American© for doubting Japan1s true inten
tions*

He commented that the memorandum certainly was not

appropos in view of current good relations, and that upon
close scrutiny, it was a one-sided declaration by the
^Foreign Office, Cable 457, Sato to Motono, October 24
1917, tfoTSSIT number (received)*
^Foreign Office, Cable 330, Motono to Sato, October 26
1917, To Ishil i T ( S e n t ) •

Japanese government.

He agreed with Tshli that the section

from 11and that the elimination” should be deleted, but
Motono went one step further and called everything after
84
the second paragraph uninteresting or undesirable *
As a substitute for the American memorandum* Motono
introduced the possibility of a protocol.

Such a document

would be executed by both parties* and if misunderstandings
were to arise in the future, it could be made public.

He

informed Ishii that a draft protocol would be sent in
85
another encoded message*
In the event of American nonconcurrence in the
protocol, Motono instructed the special envoy to recommend
a change in the American memorandum.

He was emphatic that

this measure was to be adopted only as a last resort*

The

Foreign Minister suggested that the paragraph that began
11In order however*1 could be changed to read, "It was well
understood that the principle coitamnlcated In the decla
ration which was thus suppressed was in perfect accord
with the policy actually pursued by the two Governmenta
In China."86
On the same day, October 26th, the draft Protocol
was cabled to Ishii.
8hb id.
85Xbld.
^Itold.

It reads
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PROTOCOL
In the course of the conversations between the
Japanese Special Ambassador and the Secretary of
State of the United States, which has led to the
exchange of notes between them dated this day,
declaring the policy of the two Governments with
regard to China, the question of embodying the
following clause in such declaration cane up for
discussion?
^They /the Government of Japan and the United
States/ will not take advantage of the present
condition to seek special rights or privileges
In China, which would abridge th© rights of the
subjects or citizens of other friendly states/*
Upon careful examination of the question it
was agreed that the clause above quoted, being
superfluous In the relations of the two Govern
ments, and liable to create erroneous impression
in the minds of the public, should be eliminated
from the declaration.
It was however well understood that the principle
enunciated In the clause which was thus suppressed
was in perfect accord with the policy actually
pursued by the two Governments in China.®*
The two statesmen conferred again on the 27th.

Ishii

reported that after some discussion, Lansing indicated
that he would withdraw the American memorandum*

The

American Secretary of State regretted the way in which the
Japanese Government was Interpreting American moves during
the .negotiations as if America were doubting Japan's
Intentions*

He Insisted that America wanted everything

mutual in Intent as well as style.

In light of these

developments, Lansing intimated that he was planning to
88
make a third proposal.
^Foreign Office, Cable 381, Motono to Sato, October 26,
1917# To Ishii IB'"(sent).
®®Foreign Office, Cable 464, Sato to Motono, October 28,
1917. i s M i W T received).

lahil Informed Lansing that Japan did not want a
memorandum., and offered as a substitute, the draft Protocol.
After explaining the Japanese position regarding this decla
ration, Ishii said that he was to explain that his govern
ment was eager to conclude the negotiations,®^
Lansing replied that the protocol would be taken
under consideration.

As the two men left the room,

Lansing commented that he also rather wished to end the
discussions, and Implied that the protocol might be the
means to end the current impasse'.90
In the message reporting this meeting Ishii informed
the Oaimusho that the Korea Maru had been reserved for the
9th of November*

The special envoy wanted to leave as

soon as possible, and asked Tokyo to get everything ready
for an exchange of notes.^
Motono1s reply of the 29th, primarily dealt with
procedures for releasing the notes to Britain and Bussia.
The two countries had been kept Informed of the progress
of the negotiations through the Japanese Ambassadors In
Kussia and Britain, Jchida and Chinda respectively.
ishii was told to cable both ambassadors and. Japan when
89ibia.
9°Xbld.
91Ibid.

the notes were exchanged *

ino foreign Minister instructed

Ishii definitely not to mention the contents of the

protocol*^
Lansing and Ishii met on the 2 9 th, to discuss the
draft Protocol submitted by Japan on the 2 7 th.

Lansing

had checked with fefilson and requested to make one minor
change*

He observed that the section f,policy actually

pursued** did not include reference to the future* and it
might cause confusion or misunderstanding*

Lansing,

recommended that it be changed to read "with the declared
policy of the two governments in regard to China, 11 The
Americans accepted all other sections of the Protocol.
Ishii sent the change to Tokyo with the comment
that on the 2 7 th, Lansing had seemed quite satisfied
with the draft1 however* after talking with the Presi
dent* they wanted a change*

Ishii believed that even

the added phrase did not commit Japan to future restraint
so he recommended it be accepted*®^
On the 3ist, Motono dispatched his approval of the
Protocol change., and informed Ishii that authorisation
^Foreign Office* Cable 389, Motono to Sato, October 29
1917# To 'Isfflti W T a e n t ).
^ F o r eign Office, Cable 466* Sato to Motono, October 29
1917, fSKil 55 (recelved on 31®t}*
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to exchange notes would be cabled on November lst*®5
The Japanese Foreign Office, also on the 31st, sent
messages to the Japanese Ambassadors in Britain and Russia*
These cables alerted the two, Chirida in Britain and Uehida
in Russia, that the negotiations had finally been con
cluded, and that within three days the resulting notes
would be exchanged*

They were instructed to inform the

Foreign Ministers in their assigned countries of this
fact, and to hand them copies of the notes as soon as
possible*

The Protocol was not to be disclosed, but

there was a possibility that in the future it would be*

96

Motono cautioned the Japanese diplomats that Germany
may try to make some propaganda capital from the exchangej
overall, he thought that the negotiations and notes
revealed a strong United States-Japanese alliance, and
he believed that the agreement would prove beneficial not
only to the United States and Japan but also to China
The release of the text of the notes prior to the
public exchange between the United States and Japan was
only being done by Japan noted the Foreign Office*

The

^Foreign Office, Cable 393, Motono to Sato, October 31
1917# To ishii' 51 (sent)
^Foreism Office. Cables 733. 734. Motono to Chinda,

97lbld.
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United States would not release the notes to anyone prior
to their official exchange*^®
The next day* November 1st, Motono informed Ishii that
all the necessary procedures had been completed In Japan,
and that Tokyo was .ready for the exchange to take place*
He instructed the special ambassador to cable japan,
Britain and Russia as soon as the exchange took place,
Chinda in Britain would cable France and Italy upon
receipt of the Ishii message.

He reported that public

release of the notes was set for November 7th, or as soon
thereafter as possible.

He asked Ishii to cable Tokyo If

anything relating to the method for disclosing the agree
ment cam© up in his discussions with Lansing
Motono followed up the above message with Instructions
to Ishii- to prepare a 11thank you” note for Lansing*

He

specifically wanted to thank the American Secretary for
helping to expose the German plot against close United
States-Japanese cooperation, and for freely discussing
all matters affecting the relations of the two countries.
The Foreign Minister wanted this letter ready for presen
tation at the exchange of notes or as soon thereafter as
... 100
possible•

98lbld.
99fforejgn Office# Cable 39^* Motono to Sato,
November"*!",' 15177’To Tshii 22 (sent),
i®®Foreign Office, Cable 39&* Motono to Sato,
November"1, iyiY, To Ishii 23 (sent).
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After receipt of Motonofs cable,, discussed immediately

above# Ishii met with Lansing and settled the manner of
releasing the notes*

He reported to the G&lmuaho that the

release would be "simple° as was desired by the Japanese
government# and would be accompanied by a statement by
Lansing*

Ishii commented that he recommended to Lansing

that release of the notes be about three days after the
exchange*

The Japanese Special Ambassador feared that a

longer delay would be likely to lead to a leak of the
101
In forma11on prernaturely.
Ishii continued his report on the accomplishments of
the day's meeting including a discussion on such minor
details as the signature element for himself# and the
lack of one for Lansing! the changing of an ffalf to a
"the" In the American copy of the Protocol# and other
minute information# 30?
On the 2nd of November# in fokyo, Motono penned
instructions for the Japanese representative in Peiping,
the Baron

in Cable 807, he directed Hayaahi to*

* ♦ * meet Chinese authorities on November 4, and
tell them the meaning of coded message 808, and
hand them a copy of the note* Cable their
101Foreign Office, Cable 476, Sato to Motono, Novem
ber 2, l W 7 T i h T r ^ { r e c e i v e d ).

102Ibld.
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reactions. However, the copy of the note for the
Chinese government is only in English (not Japa
nese), Also* dcn*fc tell them at all about the
Protocol. So* please be reminded. On November 1st,
the British* French, Bussi&n and Italian Ambas
sadors resident in Japan were told privately . . . ♦
Official notes will be exchanged on the 2nd or 3rd.
A few days after the exchange it will be released.
So, up till that time, please remind the Chinese
government to keep it secret.
Cable 808, mentioned above which was to be briefed to
the Chinese only reviewed the fact the United StatesJapanese diplomatic discussions had taken place*

The

Chinese were to be told that the results of the negotia
tions would improve the relations between the United States
and Japan, and would reflect a "correct and friendly” policy
by the two governments toward China.

Motono concluded

encoded Cable 808 with, " I believe Asia will have peace
and security.
The day after instructing Hayashl to notify the
Chinese of the Impending exchange of notes, Tokyo received
one of Ishiifs last cables from Washington.

The special

ambassador reported a conversation with Lansing on the
2nd during which the American Secretary had specifically
observed that China was not among the nations to be
notified by Japan of the official exchange.
^ ^Foreign Office, Cable 807, Motono to Hayashl,
November"27
K^Foreign Office, Cable 808, Motono to Hayashl,
November 12, lylT^
^Foreign Office, Cable 477, Sato to Motono,
November 3, l9 lY7 "T3Hii 56 (re cei ve d } .
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Motono., in a rather rapid reply, i-eminded Ishii that
the scheme for notifying Allied countries prior to release
cf the notes was available to Sato, arid trial it made
provision for alerting only four countries, Lritain,
Russia, France, and Italy*

For some reason, Motono

was Steeping his special representative In the dark con
cerning the release to China*

In any ease, this catla

clearly exonerates Ishii from any knowledge of coming
events.
On the same clay that Motono dispatched the above
t o ssage,

he received one that had been awaited eagerly

for several months.

Cable 479 from the Viscount in

Washington, notified the Oaimusho that the notes had been

exchanged on the morning of the 2nd•

Ishii had signed

two copies of the protocol, and had kept one.

Release

was to be on the 7th in Tokyo, and In Washington on the
afternoon of the 6th.

The Naval Agreement was to be

released by Lansing at the same time
lo6ibia.
^ T p 0ralgn Office, Cable 405, Motono to Sato,
November 3, 19i77 fo^fshll 28 (sent).
^^Foreign Office, Cable 479* Sato to Motono,
November~*3T"T3T7* Xshii 5& (received).
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Ishii*s closing words In this message were, "Going
to leave tomorrow afternoon, November 3, 1917.
Motono Quickly dispatched a thank-you note to Ishii
which cited all the hardships that had been overcome by
the Viscount satisfactorily to complete the negotiations
110
and exchange notes*
On the 4th, Motono received Ishii*s last dispatch
from the American capital.

In it the special ambassador

reported what l^anslng1© statement would contain when the
notes were released*

Generally, tensing was going to cover

the facts that the notes would remove all misunderstanding,
assure continued friendship for both countries, keep peace
in the Orient, and demonstrate to enemy nations a strong
unity between the United States and Japan*

His state

ment, the Viscount concluded, would commend the part
ill
played by the Japanese Special Ambassador.
Ishii left Washington for the West Coast on the
evening of November 3rd.

u p

As he traveled a drama, was

unfolding in Peiping about which the special ambassador
had no advance knowledge*
1 0 9 lbld.

llOgorelgn_Office, Cable 409, Motono to Sato,
November '3, lylYT ‘"foTshil 29 (sent).
II^Foreign Office, Cable 482, Sato to Motono,
November 4,r iylY,'’IshTi 59 (received) *
H ^Foreign Office, Viscount Ishii*3 Itinerary, Film 431*
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Baron Hayashl, as instructed by Minister for Foreign
Affairs Motono# called on the Chinese Foreign Minister to
deliver c o n fid e n tia l information on the Just concluded

Japanese*-American negotiations*

Finding him sick# he

dutifully contacted the Deputy Foreign Minister and
explained the events of the Immediate past***3
After carefully studying the note# the Chinese diplo
mat replied#

"Germany attempted to disrupt American-

Japanese relations using Chinese affairs which is so
stated in the Mote*

So# a t this time# to have agreement

between America and Japan is c e rta in ly suited to the
«114
current situation.
The Chinese official additionally noted that he
would inform the appropriate government officials eon115
com ing this matter*
Hayashl# in his report# recounted the above event,
and added that he would fee visiting Prime Minister Tuan
in the a f t e r n o o n This he did*

In noting Tuan*s

reaction# Hayashl reported that the Chinese Prims
Minister had thanked him for the private notification#
H 3poreign Office# Cable 1530# Hayashl to Motono#
November 4#' I 9I7 *

ll4ibia.
115Ibld.

ll6Ibld.
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but had Indicated that he wanted to think about it for
awhile because of its importance to China***7
The Inevitable happened*

That against which Ishii

had warned the Foreign Office occurred*

Soon after the

confidential release to the Chinese* by coincidence or
intent* the news of the agreement was leaked
According to the American Minister Keinseh* the
Chinese* after their private exposure to the notes*
expressed the belief that they had been fores&ken by the
United States.

Chinese dismay, and* it might be added,

that of Keinsch* was abject***®
In the meantime* quite oblivious t© these develop
ments* ishii sped westward to arrive in San Francisco on
the 8th of November*
The next day* Ishii telegraphed a farewell message
to Lansing and boarded the Korea Maru for Japan *

On the

morning of the l6th* 'the Ishii Party arrived in Honolulu*
and that afternoon they were once again on the high sea®
121
and headed for Yokohama.
*^Foreign Office, Cable 153^# Hayashl to Motono*
N ove mbe ^ ¥ , 1 9 1 7 ^

ll8ftelnaeh, jgg. £ii*» P* 312.
119Ibld.
l^OporelKn Offlea, viscount Isiill*s Itinerary. Film 432.
iaiIbld., Film 433.

The welcomed sig h t o f Mount F u ji In

the w in ter

was

Is h ii* a once again as the Korea Mama a rriv e d a t the p o rt
o f Yokohama on the 26th o f November.

12£Ibld., Film 433.

CONCLUSION
In assessing the Ishii Mission and its success or
failure* one must return to the instructions which
Viscount Ishii received from the Terauchl Cabinet.

A

brief recapitulation of the main points reveals the
followingt
1*

Ishii was ordered to meet President Wilson

and deliver congratulations from the Emperor on America's
entry into the war*
2.

Ha was to negotiate a pact on Pacific s ec u rity

and related matters.

The extent of Japanese participation

in this pact was to be based on American desires.
3.

The special ambassador was directed to make

Japan's thoughts and desires clearly known to the United
States relating to China and the Japanese living in the
United State®.
4.

Finally, he was to indicate Japan's concern

about post war disposition of the German Pacific Islands.1
The mission accomplished three points satisfactorily.
Ishii clearly fulfilled the instructions of points one,
^Foreign Office* Letter, Decisions of the Cabinet
Counci 1 on 5fiel
l
‘'TsElT Mission and fnstrucTTons for Viscount
T S K I T r M y ^ , 1 5 I 7 . ----------- ---------------- ----------
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two and four; however# point three which encompassed
the complex problems of Japanese-American relations in
China, as well as the immigration issue requires closer
examination*

I t was hoped that the mission would be able to
eradicate the causaa of concern and misunderstanding
between the United States and Japan.

In referring to

this, Ishii1s instructions stated In parti
The American policies at which the Japanese are
chagrined are the American political and economic
activities In China and the unfair and prejudicial
treatment of Japanese in the United States*

The notes finally exchanged between the two nations
did not curtail in any way the American economic and
political activity which had given original Impetus to
the months of negotiations.

The United States did not

agree to restrict Its economic activities to non~Japa~

nese are as of interest nor did i t agree to Japanese
management of American investments*

In fact, Lansing

Informed Ishii of American intent to lend up to ten

m illio n dollars to China, and the fact th a t America
seemed to support Chinese troop Involvement in Europe.
In that respect, the American political and economic
thorn was not removed from Japan1s side.
The mission evidently relegated the task of
Improving the lot of the average Japanese resident
^Ibid.
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of the United States to tertiary importance.

On the 26th

of September, Ishii obtained Lansing* a commitment to con
tinue discussions on the Bryan-Chinda Agreement with
Ambassador Sato.

This was the only concrete item realised

in conjunction with the immigration problem.3
Attempts by the mission to mollify or restrict
American political and economic interference In China and
improve the conditions for the Japanese living in America
were less than successful.

The Ishii Mission did not#

therefore# completely satisfy the instructions of the
Cabinet Council directive.
Due to the ambiguity of the notes, the Japanese
were still able to reap considerable diplomatic capital.
By having the most r e s tr ic tiv e phrases# as fa r as Japa
nese policy was concerned# confined to the confidential
Protocol# Japan was able to interpret the agreement to
the rest of the world as American recognition of its
preeminent position in China.
Ishii# himself, If not convinced that he had won
recognition of Japanese preeminence in China at least
was convinced that he had obtained a Monroe Doctrine In
Asia for Japan.

This interpretation was possible as he

^Foreign Office# Cable 332, Sato to Motono, September 23, T§lT# "isHii 26 (received).
^Ishii, op. clt., pp. 124-132.
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considered that an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine would In no
way conflict with the independence or territorial
integrity of China which the notes recognised*5

In the end, tensing and Ishii agreed to recognize
Japan*a special interests In return for a re a ffirm a tio n
of Japan1a respect for the open door* respect for China's
territorial integrity, and a statement denying Intent to
use the war for disproportionate gains in China*

It

enabled the United States to keep Japan out of G e m any*a
awaiting arms for the period of the war, and in return
was ambiguous enough to satisfy Japanese purposes*
The real significance of the notes to Japan appears

to have been in the way they put them to use in their
relations with China.

Helnsoh states that Chinese dis

may over the notes was translated Into a stronger influence
of the pro-Japanese clique In the Peiping government j
this group was instrumental in concluding the secret

jap&nese-Chlnese negotiations of 1918.

"Through these

agreements Japan obtained China1s de facto recognition
of Japanese interests in S h a n t u n g To China these

^Foreign O ffic e * Cable 381, Sato to Motono, September^SB, TSlT, TSill 25 (received)*
^Reinsch, op. cit., p. 316.
^John Edgar Endicott, "Japanese Aspirations at the
Paris Peace Conference, 1919” Iunpublished paper, Depart
ment of History, University of Omaha), p. 13*
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treaties of 19X8 were ultimately more damaging than the
agreements resulting from the Twenty-one Demands as
duress was not involved.
The Lansing-Ishii Agreement cannot be considered

Instrum ental in the conclusion of these treaties, but
it can be said th a t It helped to create an atmosphere in
which the secret accords became realities.
Although the notes contributed in some small way to
strengthening Japan's apparent position in relation to
China, there was neither a winner nor loser, vanquished
nor victor in this brief episode of Amerlcan-Japanese
diplomatic relations.

The two nations retreated behind

the screen of ambiguity to conceal from the world basic
areas of unrecone11able national objectives*
This convenient arrangement lasted a brief six
years.

By 1923

notes had become embarrassing and

were superseded by the Washington Treaties*
Ishii had Journeyed to the United States with
instructions which reflected a confident, almost arrogant,
Japan.

In America he encountered a new idealism almost

completely devoid of the pragmatism of past American
administrations.

Forced to negotiate from a rigid

Japanese position and faced w ith an equally unbanding
American attitude, Ishii sought to obtain an agreement
which had only the hallmark of victory, not the substance.
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Is h ii re a lis e d , 1 a® sure, b e tte r than meet th a t h ie
n atio n and the one he had Just v is ite d would u ltim a te ly
clash on the so lu tio n o f the problems momentarily tabled
by the Lanslng~Xshil Agreement.

APPENDIX
THE PINAL AGREEMENT
(FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO VISCOUNT ISHII)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 2, 1917.
Excellency«I have the honor to communicate herein my under
standing of the agreement reached toy us in our recent
conversations touching the questions of mutual interest
to our Governments relating to the Republic of China*
In order to silence mischievous reports that have
from time to time been circulated, it is believed toy
us that a public announcement once more of the desires
and intentions shared by our two Governments with regard
to China is advisable*
The Governments of the United States and Japan
recognize that territorial propinquity creates special
relations between countries, and, consequently the
Government of the United States recognizes that Japan
has special interests in China, particularly in the
part to which her possession© are contiguous*
The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless,
remains unimpaired and the Government of the United States
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has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the
Imperial Japanese Government that while geographical
position gives Japan such special interests they have no
desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations
or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted
by China in treaties with other Powers.
The Governments of the United States and Japan deny
that they have any purpose to in frin g e in any way the
Independence or territorial Integrity of China and they
declare furthermore that they always adhere to the prin
ciple of the so-called "open door" or equal opportunity
for commerce and industry in China,
Moreover* they mutually declare that they are opposed
to the acquisition by any Government of any special right©

or privileges that would affect the independence or terri
torial Integrity of China or that would deny to the sub
jects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of
equal opportunity In the commerce and industry of China,

I shall be glad to have Your Excellency confirm
this understanding of the agreement reached by us,
Accept, Excellency, e tc . etc, etc.

ROBERT LANSING1

1goreIan Office, Diplom atic Note from Lanaing to Is h ll,
November*
gJ'liaa 253-234.

1X5
(FROM V I S C O U N T ISHII T O T H E SECRE T A R Y OF STATE)

JAPANESE E M B A S S Y *

Washington* November 2, 1917#
Sirs
I

have the honor to a c k n o w l e d g e the receipt of

your note of to-day* communicating to me your u n d e r 
standing

of the agreement reached by us i n our recent

conversations touching the questions of mutual Interest
to our Governments relating to the Republic of China*
I

am happy t o be able to confirm t o you, under

authorisation of my Government* the u n d e r s t a n d i n g in
question set forth in the f o l l o w i n g t e r m s s
In order to silence mischievous reports that have
from time to time been circulated* it is believed by u s
that a public announcement once more of the desires and
intentions shared by our two Governments with regard to
China is advisable.
The Governments of Japan and the United States
recognise

that territorial propinquity creates special

relations between countries* and* consequently the
Government of the United States recognises that Japan
has special Interests in China* particularly in the
part to which her possessions are contiguous*
The b ..rritordal sovereignty of China* nevertheless*
remains unimpaired and the Government of the United States
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has every confidence in the repeated 'assurances of the
Imperial Japanese Government that while geographical
position gives Japan such special interests they have
no desire to discriminate against the trade of other
nations or to d i s r e g a r d t h e c o m m e r c i a l rights heretofore
granted by China in treaties with other Powers.
The Governments of Japan and t h e United States deny
that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the
independence or territorial integrity of China and they
declare f u r t h e r m o r e that they always adhere to the prin
ciple of the so-called Mo p e n door” or equal opportunity
for commerce and Industry In China*
Moreover, they mutually declare t h a t they are opposed
to the acquisition by any Government of any special right®
or privileges that would affect the Independence or terri
torial integrity of China or that would deny to the sub
jects or citizen® of any country the full e n j o y m e n t of
equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.
I take etc. etc. etc.
K. ISHII
Ambassador Extraordinary and Pleni2
potentiary on Special Mission.

2Foreign Office, Diplomatic Note from Ishii to Lansing,
November "2, a'9T7$ M i m s 258-260.
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THE TOXTKjD STATES-JAFANESE NAVAL COOPERATION NOTE
Complete and satisfactory understanding upon the
matter of the naval cooperation in the Pacific for the
purpose of attaining the common object against Oenaany
and her Allies have

been reached between the

Representatives of the Imperial Japanese Navy who is
/£±&7 attached to the Special Mission of Japan and the
Representatives of the United States Navy.^

^Foreign Office, Cable 480, Sato to Motono, November 2,
1917 (received“nMoviHber 3# 1917)*
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ISHII1B F A m m h L LETTER TO LAN S I M
My final departure from Washington affords a fit
occasion for m© to express once more to the American
people my deep sense of gratitude for the cordial reeep-*
tlon and hospitality accorded to the special mission of
Japan,

The spontaneous and enthusiastic manifestations

of friendship and goodwill toward us on all hands have
profoundly Impressed not only the m e m b e r s of the mission
but th e whole Japanese people*

The kindly feeling and

fraternal spirit always existing between the two nations
have never been more emphatically testified.

Believing

aa I do In frank talking I have tried the beat I could,
in my public utterance© in this country, t o tell the
truth and the facts about my country, t he aspirations
and motives which spur my nation, for to my mind it is
misrepresentation and the lack of information that allow
discordance and distrust to creep in the relationship
between nations*

I am happy to think that at a time

when the true unity and cooperation b e t w e e n the allied
nations are dire necessities, It has been given me to
contribute in my small way to a better understanding and
appreciation among the Americans with regard to Japan.
The new understanding In regard to the line of policy
to be followed by Japan and America respecting the
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Republic of Chins augurs well for the undisturbed main
tenance of the harmonious accord and good neighborhood
between our two countries.

It certainly w i l l do away

with all doubts that have n o w and t h e n shadowed the J a p a nese-Amerlcan

relationship.

It cannot fall to defeat f o r

all time the pernicious efforts of German agents to whom
every new situation developing in China always furnished
so fruitful a field for black machinations.

For the rest

this new understanding, of our*s substantiates the soli
darity of comradeship which Is dally gaining strength
among the honorable and worthy nations of th e civilised
world.

It is a great pleasure for me to add that this

declaration has been reached as an outcome o f free exchange
of frank views between the two Governments.

I cannot pay

too high a tribute to the sincerity and farsightedness
of Secretary Lansing with whom it was my privilege to
associate in so pleasurable a way*

It is my f i r m belief

that so long as the two G o v e r n m e n t s maintain a perfectly
appreciative attitude toward each other, so long as there
is no lack of statesmanship to guide public opinion, the
reign of peace and tranquility in our part of the world
will remain unchallenged.
(Signed)^

^Foreign Office, Letter, Ishli to Lansing, November ?,
1917*
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